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How Oracle Erred:
Functionality, Useful Articles, and the Future of Computer Copyright*

Wendy J. Gordon**

Preface and summary
In Oracle v. Google (2015), the Federal Circuit addressed whether the
“method header” components of a dominant computer program were
uncopyrightable as “merging” with the headers’ ideas or function. Google had
copied the headers to ease the ability of third-party programmers to interact with
Google's Android platform. The court rebuffed the copyrightability challenge; it
reasoned that because the plaintiff's expression might have been written in
alternative forms, there was no "merger" of idea and expression. However, the
Oracle court may have been asking the wrong question.
In Lotus v. Borland (1995), the owner of a dominant spreadsheet program
sought to prevent a new competitor's program from making available a set of
'command menu' headers based on the dominant program's menus. The defendant
also wrote its own, original command menus, but provided the copied menus as an
option to relieve customers who, migrating from the dominant spreadsheet, would
otherwise have had a substantial burden to master new terms and rewrite macros.
In assessing the legality of the copying, the First Circuit started its inquiry
not with a question about how the plaintiff's program might have been written, but
rather with how the program actually was written. It then identified the menu
commands as "methods of operation" because they were necessary to make the
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actual program operate a computer. The copyright statute renders "methods of
operation" per se uncopyrightable, regardless of the possibility of alternatives.
Debates over the conflict between Oracle and Lotus have largely ignored a
middle road that supports the Lotus result without the potential for overkill some
observers see in Lotus. This middle road is a doctrine known as the
“explanation/use" distinction. Laid out in the classic Supreme Court case of Baker
v. Selden (1800), and ratified by statutory provisions of the Copyright Act
including the much-ignored Section 113(b), the “explanation/use distinction"
specifies that a copyright owner has no power to control behaviors that belong to
the domain of utility patent. Like "merger" and "method of operation", the
"explanation/use" doctrine implements the deference that, pursuant to
Congressional command and Supreme Court precedent, US copyright law must
give to patent law. However, the explanation/use doctrine operates by limiting the
scope of the exclusive rights a copyright owner might otherwise possess, not by
targeting the copyrightability of what the plaintiff produced.
This chapter examines justifications for the “explanation/use distinction”,
and suggests a two-part test for implementing that doctrine. The chapter argues that
a copyright owner should have no prima facie rights over copying behavior where
(1) the goals of the copying are “use” (behavior in the realm of utility patent) and
(2) the copying is done solely for goals unrelated to the expressiveness of the
plaintiff’s work of authorship. (The copying of Oracle and Lotus seem to have
been fully indifferent to expressive values; the result might be different in a case
where defendant's goals are mixed.)
This two-part test is met by the defendants in Oracle and Lotus. (1) Making
a machine operate is clearly utilitarian. And as for (2) indifference to expression,
both Lotus and Oracle involve someone copying a computer interface to enable
users to interoperate: third party programmers could use or design Java-enabled
programs on Android, and spreadsheet users could use their prior macros on a new
spreadsheet program. Interoperability is one of the few areas where indifference to
expression is clear: after all, when one wants a spare key made, the elegance or
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beauty of the key's shape is irrelevant – all that matters is that the shape fits the
lock.
1 Introduction
The world would look far different than it does if copyright law covered
functional expression without limit. Someone who imagines they can “build a
better mouse trap” would need only to sketch it on paper, or draw it on a computer
screen and hit "save"1”, to secure for the purported innovation over seventy years
of legal protection2 against copying.3 Anyone else who makes or sells a similar
1

Nations differ on the extent to which 'fixation in a tangible medium' is required for copyright,
and as to the definition of 'fixation'. Under US law pre-1978, saving a screen drawing to a
computer disk would not have qualified as a copyrightable 'writing' because the drawing could
not be visually perceived from the desk except with the aid of a machine; post 1978, direct visual
perception became unnecessary. 17 U.S.C. § (2102) (definition of "copy"). Unless otherwise
specified, all references to law are to federal law of the United States.
2

US Copyrights that come into being today have a duration of either (a) seventy years beyond
the life of the author, or (b) the shorter of 120 years from creation or ninety-five years from
publication (for works made for hire and some other categories). 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Utility
patents by contrast have a duration of no more than twenty years. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2) (2012)
(providing that utility patents end twenty years from filing date). Design patents are even shorter,
fifteen years from the date of grant. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2015), as amended by Patent Law Treaties
Implementation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 91–190, § 102, 125 Stat. 1527 (2012).
The instant chapter is concerned with the intersection of copyright law with the law of utility
patents. That is where the most significant conflict with copyright occurs. Design patents pose no
such tension for copyrights because, like copyrights, they are supposed to be unavailable for
elements that are “functional.” See L. A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,
1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the particular design is essential to the use of the article, it cannot be
the subject of a design patent.”)
3

There was a period when United Kingdom and Canadian law took this extreme path. See, e.g.,
Spiro-Flex Indust. Ltd. v. Progressive Sealing Inc., 1986 CanLII 771 (BC SC), available at
www.canlii.org/en/bc/bcsc/doc/1986/1986canlii771/1986canlii771.html
Both nations now take a somewhat more patent-deferential approach to design protection.
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device would be in danger of suit.4 By similarly simple means, any car maker or
other manufacturer could eliminate competition in the making of spare parts.
Markets for physical products are not the only things that would change. So
would markets for electronics and digital content. If copyright had no boundaries
where functionality was concerned, a designer of a leading video game could
choose one console and, by asserting its copyright, forever5 limits its fans to that
console. Similarly a console maker could bar any “unlicensed” game from playing
on its machine. Or the seller of an application program could ensure that once its
customers learn the program’s intricacies and prepare macros6 based upon its
4

Admittedly, Copyright gives rights only over "copying." By contrast, patent infringement can
arise regardless of whether or not the defendant who makes and sells a version of the patented
innovation has copied it or independently invented it.
But the copyright plaintiff’s need to prove actual “copying” (a kind of “cause in fact”) is less of a
barrier to lawsuits than it once was. Given the pervasiveness of mass media, and the internet's
ability to gives access largely without regard to geographic boundaries, copyright defendants
find it harder to prove they never had contact with a plaintiff’s work. Also, because subconscious
copying can trigger copyright liability, at least in the US, defendants cannot be sure that telling
their truth on the witness stand (“I cannot remember copying and I believe I did not copy”) will
make a difference, even if the jury believes them.
5

A game (if a work for hire) would have copyright for roughly a century. Each new version of
the game would have a new, full-duration copyright in any distinguishable variations added since
the prior version. By continually tweaking its games, a company whose copyright knew no
functional boundaries could lock its fan base into a particular platform for as long as the fan base
continued to exist. By the time that the original version of a game entered the public domain,
there would likely be no machines left capable of playing it.
6

A user can assign a complex set of commands to a simpler keystroke command. This is called
writing a “macro.” For example, in using a word processing program, someone who authors
documents containing many lengthy quotations might tell her program that a particular keystroke
combination (say, hitting “control-alt-q” at the same time) should put highlighted text into
quotation form: indenting it and making it single spaced. Thereafter, she could properly format
long quotes just by highlighting the relevant text and hitting control-alt-q.
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keystroke commands, the customers’ learning and all their macros will be
worthless if they ever switch to a new provider. The makers of computers, smart
phones, or game consoles could limit use of their machines only to programs, apps,
and games of which the makers approve.
But copyright law does not cover functional expression without limit. Most
of the results just described could not be achieved through copyright,7 for both
Congress and the courts have sharply limited copyright’s operation in the field of
functionality.8 Copyright law defers to patent when it comes to functional use, and
patents are short-lived and hard to get.
Moreover, patent law jealously guards the public domain status of the
functional works that it declines to protect. In the words of the Supreme Court,
“the federal patent laws do create a federal right to ‘copy and to use,’”9 a right
which is applicable both to expired patents and to “potentially patentable ideas
which are fully exposed to the public.”10 The patent public domain similarly
7

Regarding the examples just mentioned: an attractively shaped automobile bumper or muffler
pipe that lacks patent can be freely copied (unless some aspect of it is a separable work of
authorship, which is unlikely), 17 U.S.C. §101(2012) (“definition of pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works”); an original drawing of a mouse trap or other functional object can have
copyright as a pictorial work, but the rights of the copyright owner do not extend to control over
the manufacture and sale of the objects depicted, 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012); copyright’s fair use
doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 107, permits the copying of copyrighted computer programs for the
purpose of making a video game compatible with existing consoles, see Sega Enters. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Accolade did not attempt to ‘scoop’
Sega’s release of any particular game or games, but sought only to become a legitimate
competitor in the field of Genesis-compatible video games. Within that market, it is the
characteristics of the game program as experienced by the user that determine the program’s
commercial success. As we have noted, there is nothing in the record that suggests that Accolade
copied any of those elements.”)
8

Many of these limits are discussed at length infra.

9

Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989) (emphasis in original)

10
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Id. (citations omitted).
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assures “‘the consuming public of the advantage to be derived’ from free
exploitation”11 of discoveries with expired or invalid patents.12 So, unsurprisingly,
many forms of right (including copyright,13 trademark,14 and contract15) are limited
lest they undermine the “balance between fostering innovation and ensuring public
access to discoveries” that “Congress struck” “[i]n crafting the patent laws.”16
The boundary doctrines that enforce copyright’s deference to patent are
continually threatened with erosion. In particular, the recent decision in Oracle v.
Google17 threatens to expand copyright’s reach into functionality. That decision, by

11

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067, *10 (2015) (quoting
from Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256).
12

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067 (2015) (upholding the
rule that royalty contracts are unenforceable to the extent they provide for the payment of
royalties after the point of patent expiration.) The Supreme Court in Kimble may have had some
doubts about the wisdom of the particular rule it upheld, but did not seem to harbor doubts about
the importance of the patent public domain.
13

See, e.g., 17 USC 102(b) (no copyright for systems or methods of operation); 113(b) (no
infringement results from building a useful article depicted in a copyrighted portrayal). These
and other limits are discussed infra, passim.
14

No trademark can be federally registered if it is “functional,” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), and no
unregistered trademark can give rise to suit under the Lanham Act unless the plaintiff carries the
burden of proving nonfunctionality. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (3) (2012); Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz
Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).
15

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. ___, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 4067 (2015) (royalty
contracts held unenforceable to the extent they provide for the payment of royalties after the
point of patent expiration.)
16

Id. at *8.

17

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding Java’s applied
programming interface (API) and its structure, sequence and organization, copyrightable as
against claims of “merger” and “method of operation”). The lower court had held the copied
6
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the Federal Circuit, increases the ability of market leaders to use copyright law to
lock out competition in a functional market – and to lock their customers, their
suppliers, and producers of complementary products into patterns that might be
privately profitable, but inefficient or otherwise undesirable from a social
perspective.
As a social practice, lock-in is quite controversial. Business schools teach
future executives how to lock in their customers and other players,18 yet antitrust
law makes some forms of lock-in unlawful.19 Scholars debate whether various
examples of potential lock-in might be socially harmful, socially useful, or
irrelevant to social welfare,20 and how the law should take lock-in into account.21
portions of Java uncopyrightable as “methods of operation.” Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc.,
872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
18

See, e.g., Kenneth J. Sousa & Effy Oz, Management Information Systems (7th Ed. Cengage,
2015) at 41, 47–8.
19

See Herbert Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to
Intellectual Property Law, sec. 21.4 (Thomson Reuters, 2010).
20

Compare, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & S. E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 30 J. Law Econ. 1,
(1990), with Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 332
(1985).
21

One issue is the doctrinal category through which to address lock-in. The instant article
makes lock-in relevant to the scope of a copyright owner's prima facie rights, but the relevance
arises indirectly: What's important to this chapter's analysis is whether copying is functional,
expressive, or a mixture of both, and copying done to escape lock-in is likely to be nonexpressive and purely functional.
Lock-in might also be relevant to copyrightability, to misuse, or to fair use. The Solicitor
General, for example, argues that lock-in should be examined under the fair use doctrine. See
e.g. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), at *17, available at
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/06/01/14410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf
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Such arguments need not be resolved for cases like Oracle v. Google. That is
because, in the context of computer programs, the techniques that companies use to
enforce lock-in typically run afoul of a historic doctrine called the “use/explanation
distinction.”22 The doctrine distinguishes between behaviors that use a copyrighted
work expressively and those that use the work without regard to its expressive
virtues, simply to serve a utilitarian function.\
For example, it is an expressive use when the publisher of a how-to book on
home repair copies someone else’s copyrighted passage explaining how to rewire a
lamp instead of writing his own instructions. It is a nonexpressive use when a
homeowner applies the same copyrighted passage to the task of actually rewiring
lighting fixtures. Copying text to convey an explanation or to serve other
expressive goals belongs to the realm of copyright; copying to build a functional
invention instead belongs to the realm of patent. These basic points about the
limited rights that attach to copyright in physical products have important
implications for computer copyright cases.
As a result of how the Oracle v. Google litigation has been structured, the
legal community concerned with computer copyright is currently focused on issues
of copyrightability. It is time to redirect our attention to include the scope of a
copyright owner’s exclusive right.
This chapter will show how the fundamental distinction between “use” and
“explanation” can resolve disputes like Oracle v. Google. The chapter will also
explore a much-ignored provision in Copyright law, Subsection 113(b) that
provides an explicit immunity for using copyrighted works functionally.
22

This chapter is focused on uses that are functional (because functional uses implicate patent
law) and indifferent to expressivity (for the indifference removes a reason for enforcing
copyright). Lock-in and the imposition of switching costs raise many other issues in addition. For
example, when a copyright owner’s acts of dissemination and enforcement combine in a way
that negatively alters another’s prospects, I argue that this does and should erode the owner’s
scope of right. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale L. J. 1533 (1993).
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2 Oracle v. Google
Oracle owns the Java set of programs, and Java is ubiquitous. Third-party
programmers are able to make their apps compatible with many platforms, and
save time in doing so, because large numbers of platforms are crafted to respond to
Java commands with predefined Java routines and subroutines. The Java routines
are activated when a programmer uses a specified “method header” accompanied
by a statement –- in particular format – of the desired inputs for a method’s
operation. Platforms are typically programmed to recognize Java method headers
(sometimes called “declaration code”) and to implement the appropriate Java
routines and subroutines (sometimes called "implementation code") in response.
Google, wanting to facilitate third-party programming for the Android
phone, tried to obtain a Java license but the parties failed to find mutually
agreeable terms.23 Much of Java is available under General Public License terms,24
but Google apparently found the free-software license restrictions inconsistent with
its business plan. Since in copyright law, unlike patent, duplication without
copying is not infringing, Google therefore used independently written
implementing code to substitute for Java’s implementing code.25 Wrote the lower
court:
It is the method body that does the heavy lifting, namely the actual
work of taking the inputs, crunching them, and returning an answer. The
method body can be short or long. Google came up with its own

23

Oracle, 750 F. 3d at 1350.

24

David Turner, The LGPL and Java, available at www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-java.html (last
visited June 8, 2015).
25

9
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implementations for the method bodies and this accounts for 97 percent of
the code for the 37 packages.26
(As for patent, Oracle brought patent claims against Google,27 but the jury
rejected them.)
It was clear that Google’s clean-room code did not copy Java’s
implementing code (some minor items aside), and it is implementing code that
does the “heavy lifting.”28 However, something significant was copied: to enable
the Android platform to recognize what a third-party program might ask for,
Google copied from Oracle’s Java program many of its method headers, and by
necessary implication, some of Java’s selection and organization.
For example, a particular small program in Java might function to compare
two integers, and tell you which one is larger. An ordinary programmer writing an
app might be able to easily write this program for herself, but it’s even easier to
call on the Java program called MAX. A third-party programmer can call on
thousands of such routines to save time – so long as the platform at which her
program is aimed recognizes the “method headers” and inputs she has employed.
Java’s slogan is “write once, run anywhere.”29

26

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter
“Oracle I”), rev’d Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hereinafter
“Oracle II”).
27

Patents as well as copyrights can exist in computer programs under today’s law. The extent of
their eligibility for patent may be limited, however. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
_U.S. _,134 S.Ct. 2347, 2357 (2014).
28

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (hereinafter
“Oracle I”), rev’d Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F. 3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (hereinafter
“Oracle II”), quoted above in text accompanying note [30].
29

Oracle, 750 F. 3d. at 1350.
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Google wanted its programs for the Android platform to recognize the
familiar identifying language. If instead of using the Java label “MAX” and its
syntax, Google had given the Android subroutine that performed the same function
a different name, like “LARGER,” then the Android platform would be
significantly harder for the Java-accustomed programming community to use. That
is, without the “method headers,” the third-party programmers would have found it
more difficult to make their programs speak to Google’s (non-infringing)
implementing code. Also, lacking the “method headers” would mean that the
Android platform could not be backwards compatible with existing application
programs that use Java – because when one of those programs needs a subroutine
to find the larger of two integers, the program calls what it needs “MAX.”
In order to compete on a level playing field with platforms running Java,
therefore, Google needed not only to provide functionality as good as Java’s, but
also needed its Android platform to recognize the known method headers and
inputs (specified in Java’s declaration code) that identified functions that the thirdparty programmers would want performed by Android’s new and noninfringing
implementation code.
In copying the headers, and making its own modules that mimicked Java
functioning, Google also copied by necessity some organization from Java30. In
particular, Google copied the selection of those functions that were important
enough to be worth creating an implementation and header for them.31
The District Court ruled that Google only copied uncopyrightable elements
of Java, and found no infringement.32 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit held
30

Organizational elements are sometimes treated as potentially copyrightable compilations. See
17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘compilation’ is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”) (Emphasis added).
31

Oracle at 1350–1.

32

Id. at 1350–1.
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that the headers could have copyrights (as could their organizational structure),
largely because many alternative ways to express and organize the headers33 had
been open to Oracle’s34 programmers.
In so holding, Federal Circuit rejected the persuasive power of a 1995 First
Circuit decision, Lotus v. Borland.35 The cases posed similar issues.
In Lotus, a challenger to the then-dominant spreadsheet program had created
a fully independent spreadsheet program, one having its own implementation code.
The new program also independently wrote its own structure of commands 36
However, the newcomer program also allowed its users to trigger an optional
interface that emulated the dominant spreadsheet’s command structure. Through
the emulation interface, users switching from the established spreadsheet program
to the new program could utilize their existing knowledge-base regarding
keystrokes. In addition, many consumers had written macros to customize the
earlier program to their purposes;37 such consumers could continue using their
macros on the new program only through the emulation interface. The emulator-a copied set of commands ordered in a particular way -- made the users' existing
macros interoperable with the new spreadsheet program.
33

See Oracle, 750 F. 3d at 1361 (“…merger cannot bar copyright protection for any lines of
declaring source code unless Sun/Oracle had only one way, or a limited number of ways, to write
them.”).
34

By “Oracle” here, I also include Oracle’s predecessor in interest, Sun. It was Sun’s
programmers who largely created Java.
35

Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
36

Virtually all application programs have command hierarchies; as a common example, users
might be instructed to hit the F key to open a "File" menu, on which the user might then find
sub-commands such as "Save" or "Save As".
37

Writing a macro enables a user to trigger a complicated sequence of commands by means of a
simple keystroke combination.
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To make the emulation interface required the new program to copy
both the command headers and some organization from the market leader. The
latter company sued for copyright infringement, but lost. The First Circuit held that
the copied commands and their hierarchy were “methods of operation.”38 Given the
statutory command that “In no case does copyright protection for an original work
of authorship extend to any . . . , method of operation . . .,” 39 the First Circuit held
that the command hierarchy could be copied. Further, the court explained, “The
fact that developers of the Lotus spreadsheet program could have designed its
menu command hierarchy differently is immaterial to the question of whether the
menu hierarchy is a “method of operation.” "40
As mentioned above, the Federal Circuit in Oracle v. Google
vigorously disagreed with the Lotus analysis of copyrightability.41 The Oracle
court instead ruled for plaintiff on this initial copyrightability issue,42 arguing that
38

Id. at 816.

39

Id. at 815–6. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) is the cited statutory section; in full Section 102(b) states: “In
no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” It is usually
assumed that "ideas" and "concepts" are outside copyright because of free speech concerns (see
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); that "discover[ies]" are outside copyright because they
are not original (see Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991)
(“facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship”); and that Congress put " system[s]" and
"method[s] of operation" outside of copyright in order to maintain patent's dominance over
functionality.
40

Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 816 (1st Cir. 1995) aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
41

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

42

This ruling may not be determinative of the ultimate outcome, of course. Although the Federal
Circuit’s decision reversed a decision that no copyright resided in the material copied from
Oracle, copyrightability is only one of the relevant issues. A petition for certiorari having been
turned down, 576 U.S. __ (2015), the case is being remanded. Oracle II, 750 F.3d at 1339.
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because all computer programs are methods of operation, adherence to the Lotus
holding would deny copyright for all computer programs and thus frustrate
Congressional intent.43
It is on the copyrightability dispute between the First and Federal Circuits
that the defendant Google relied in seeking Supreme Court review. Although cert
was denied,44 it is useful to see how Google’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari
framed the disputed question:
Whether copyright protection extends to all elements of an original work of
computer software, including a system or method of operation that an author could
have written in more than one way.45
These two views of copyrightability -- one upholding copyright when
'alternative' expressions existed, and one refusing to look for 'alternatives' when
faced with a method of operation-- also dominated discussion of Oracle. Yet
approaches to copyrightability need not determine the overall outcome of cases
like Oracle and Lotus.
Central to both Lotus46 and Oracle47 is the iconic Supreme Court case, Baker
v. Selden.48 Despite the age of the opinion (Baker v. Selden dates from 1880),
43

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576 U.S.
__ (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), available at
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf.
44

Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 576 U.S.
__ (June 29, 2015) (No. 14–410), available at
www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/062915zor_4g25.pdf.
45

Petition for Certiorari, Google, Inc. v. Oracle America, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
83 U.S.L.W. 3240 at i. (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14–410), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 4113.
46

Lotus, 49 F.4d. at 816–7.

47

Lotus, 49 F.4d. at 816–7.

14

WJ GORDON April 7, 2016 DRAFT HOW ORACLE ERRED (LONG VERSION)

Baker was a primary focus of the Supreme Court’s questions during oral argument
in Lotus,49 and conflicting views of Baker stood at the core of the Federal Circuit’s
Oracle opinion and of the Oracle defendant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. As
will appear below, Baker makes important rulings on copyrightability, but it also
provides a new avenue (outside issues of copyrightability) for handling some
software
An irony
Before examining the new avenue, let us note the parallel way the Federal
Circuit handled the subject-matter issue in another area. In trademark law,
"functional" shapes are ineligible for trade dress protection, for the same reasons of
patent -deference that limit the reach of copyright.50 Defining "functionality" has of
course been the subject of much litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court in TrafFix v.
MDR51 ruled that the availability of alternative product shapes could not “save” an
otherwise functional shape from being unsuitable subject matter for trademark
ownership.52 The Federal Circuit responded to TrafFix essentially by taking
48

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). (Much of the secondary literature gives the opinion’s
date as 1879. Although the case was argued in 1879, the opinion came down in 1880).
49

The oral argument is available at www.oyez.org/cases/1990–1999/1995/1995_94_2003

50

The core of trademark law is “distinctiveness as to source.” Protection for product shapes on
the ground of “distinctiveness” is called “trade dress.” No form of trade dress protection is
permitted for functional configurations. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Qualitex v. Jacobson
Products, 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (“The functionality doctrine … forbids the use of a product’s
feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because
the feature is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects its cost or quality.” [citing
Inwood Labs v. Ives Labs, 456 U.S. 844, 851, fn. 10 (1982)]”).
51

TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001).

52

Id. at 25.

The Fifth Circuit case Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v. Ritter Gmbh well illustrates the
TrafFix approach. In Eppendorf, a syringe had a flange that was supported against deformation
by a particular design for fins. The plaintiff sought trade dress protection for the fins as
15
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evasive maneuvers, saving questionable trademark rights in functional product
shapes by re-introducing “the availability of alternatives.”53
distinctive and nonfunctional trade dress, relying on expert testimony indicating that many
different fin designs-- many alternatives -- could have supported the flange. The particular design
was nevertheless held ineligible for trademark protection. Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v.
Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 357–8 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Eppendorf’s experts concede that fins of
some shape, size or number are necessary to provide support for the flange and to prevent
deformation of the product. … [T]hey are functional as a matter of law. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33–
34.") (Emphasis added.) The juridical irrelevance of alternative flange designs could not be more
obvious.
Copyright uses a similar approach in the “separability” hurdle that useful three-dimensional
articles must surmount in order to obtain copyright. Thus, when the Second Circuit denied
copyright to sculpted mannequins used for clothing displays, the court did not ask whether the
sculpted torsos could have been shaped differently. Instead, the Court looked at the shapes as
they existed. Since all the elements served a function, no elements survived the separability
inquiry. Thus, despite the obvious possibility of sculpting torsos differently, there was nothing to
which a copyright could attach:
[T]he features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-size configuration of the breasts
and the width of the shoulders, are inextricably intertwined with the utilitarian feature, the
display of clothes. [A] model of a human torso, in order to serve its utilitarian function, must
have some configuration of the chest and some width of shoulders…
Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985). Although courts
vary in their definitions of “separability,” no court will give copyright to a useful product shape
simply because alternative shapes exist. One court seems to be flirting with including some
consideration of alternatives into "separability", Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc.,
372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004), but even that court's dominant inquiry is not "alternatives". Its
focus is on the degree to which the design process was free of "utilitarian pressures".
The separability test – more demanding than the “merger” test that also denies copyright to
works of authorship – is mandated by the definition of sculptural works in the statute. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”).
53

See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See 1-2A
Gilson on Trademarks § 2A.04 (“The Federal Circuit believes its pre-TrafFix test is still good
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So when in Oracle the Federal Circuit took the same route as it had in
trademark – validating non-patent rights over functional subject matter by asking
“are alternatives possible?” –it perhaps should not have been surprising. The
chapter will suggest that much as the Federal Circuit attempted to evade the full
import of the Supreme Court’s TrafFix opinion for functionality in trademark law,
the Federal Circuit in Oracle now attempts to evade the full import of the Supreme
Court’s Baker opinion for functionality in copyright.
3 Copyright Uses and Patent Uses: Baker v. Selden
As mentioned, the core Supreme Court case on functional use of copyrighted
works is Baker v. Selden.54 Despite being over 200 years old, the opinion was
relied on both by the Lotus55 and Oracle decisions.56 The case involved the
copying of accounting forms.
law and continues to use its Morton-Norwich analysis that recognizes evidence of alternative
designs as “part of the overall mix. … The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board follows the
Federal Circuit …”)
A better ground for trying to narrow TrafFix might have been to argue that the TrafFix approach
should apply only to product features which, like the dual-spring device at issue in TrafFix, had
previously been protected by a now-expired utility patent. I would argue that such a narrowing,
too, is questionable. (The Fifth Circuit, for example, applies the TrafFix approach to defining
trademark’s functionality bar without any hint the approach should be limited to those features
that had been previously protected by a utility patent. See Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz Gmbh v.
Ritter Gmbh, 289 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2002).) But least such a position would have had some
plausible textual support. Presumably the Federal Circuit did not adopt this more plausible
position because it would have bound the Circuit to follow the Supreme Court at least in cases
involving expired patents.
54

Baker, 101 U.S. 99 (1800).

55

Baker v. Selden is discussed both by the majority, 49 F.3d 807 at 813-17, and by the
concurrence, 49 F.3d 807 at 819. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, (1st Cir.
1995) aff'd, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)
56

Oracle II at 1355-57.
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3.1 Introducing Baker v. Selden
Selden’s widow and administratrix, as plaintiff, asserted copyright in a
number of books that both explained and illustrated the decedent’s supposedly
novel method of bookkeeping. The Selden method enabled an accountant to use
fewer volumes and work more expeditiously. Baker was alleged to have copied
accounting forms from Selden’s books, for sale en masse to accountants. Baker’s
forms differed somewhat from Selden’s, but the litigants’ focus was not on how
similar or different the forms might have been. Rather, their focus was on whether
Baker’s forms enabled accountants to reach the same practical results via the same
system as did Selden’s.57
The Supreme Court was concerned lest copyright allow an end-run
around the requirements imposed by patent law. Patents are secured only by prior
review and must be registered to give the public notice of their content; copyrights
arise without either necessity. Patents last a short time; copyrights remain
assertable for decades longer. Patents are supposed to issue only upon passing
rigorous tests of novelty and nonobviousness; copyrights arise in virtually any
doodle, letter home from camp, or amateur recording of street noise. In nowclassic language, the Court wrote:
To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would
be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not
of copyright. … The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit
of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object
of the one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured
by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters
patent.58
57

Id. at 101 (“The evidence of the complainant is principally directed to the object of showing
that Baker uses the same system as that which is explained and illustrated in Selden’s books.”).
58

Id. at 102, 105.
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So the functional system or other useful art could not be copyrighted, even
though copyright could subsist in the textual explanation or pictorial illustration of
the art.
But this conclusion did not necessarily leave a work with functional
goals without copyright altogether. A copyright might lose its force as against
some forms of copying and yet retain its force against others. The kind of use
makes a difference: a diagram that is a "necessary incident" to a system can be
used freely by the public for "purposes of practical application" but not "for the
purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art".59 This distinction has
become known as the “use/explanation" doctrine.60
The best-known result of the Baker Court's concern with keeping copyright
from interfering with patent law was Baker's holding that systems could not be
copyrightable. But copyrightability is only one of copyright's dimensions; another
is the nature of the 'exclusive rights' a copyright owner is granted.61 Baker v.

59

Id at 103. The Court writes, similarly, that, "[W]hilst no one has a right to print or publish his
book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in the art, any
person may practice and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein. . . .
And, of course, in using the art, the ruled lines and headings of accounts must necessarily be
used as incident to it." Id. at 104.
60

As the reader may have noticed, the name of the doctrine comes from a portion of the opinion
that is a bit inapposite, as the portion focuses more on copyrightability than on the scope of
exclusive right:
"The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object
of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it
can be secured at all, by letters-patent."
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105.
61

Copyright has essentially three dimensions: duration (has the copyright expired?), subject
matter (is the work original, fixed in a tangible medium, and a protectable type of authorship?),
19
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Selden operated in both dimensions: the opinion posited that even when a valid
copyright existed, deference to patent would place limits on the scope of a
copyright owner’s rights.62 That second aspect of Baker, the aspect dealing not
with copyrightability but with scope of right, is this chapter's main topic.
Baker and its progeny distinguish between two types of behaviors that
employ created works: uses that are suitable for copyright regulation, and uses that
should be regulated solely by patent law. Baker's ruling that copyright owners do
not have the same rights to control each type63 of behavior, provides another
avenue for examining copying in suits like Oracle v. Google. This new avenue
focuses on limiting a copyright owner’s rights over functional use rather than on
denying copyright to functional subject matter.64
and exclusive right (is the defendant accused of a behavior over which the copyright owner has
an exclusive right?)
62

There is an identity between the “rights” of the owner and the “uses” that the owner controls.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (granting to copyright owner exclusive rights to control use of the
work via reproduction, use of the work via public performance, use of the work via public
display, and so on.)
63

Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.

64

At the risk of blurring definitional boundaries, it should be noted that many subject-matter
questions can be stated in terms of exclusive rights, and vice versa. For example, one could say,
equally, that "systems are not copyrightable" or that ""copyright owners have no right to control
the functional copying of their systems."

The point at issue in this chapter is whether Baker can allow the public to engage in some
functional use of a program (say, uses which are 'purely' nonexpressive) while allowing the
computer program author to retain copyright control over other uses.

It's easy to interpret Baker as requiring complete denial of copyright -- after all, the opinion does
say, "The conclusion to which we have come is, that blank account-books are not the subject of
20
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At first glance this approach from Baker may seem as broad in its impact
as the Lotus decision that held computer-program command structures
uncopyrightable. However, as this chapter shows below, the approach need not
imperil the overall copyrightability of computer programs, and would not eliminate
all ability of computer-program copyright owners to bring suit against
economically significant use.65 The “rights” approach from Baker instead draws
some helpful lines – and note that the approach has nothing to do with
“alternatives”, which had been key to the Oracle court's decision in favor of
plaintiff.
3.1 Significance
Had the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden enabled copyright owners to
control functional uses of the utilitarian systems or devices their copyrighted works
portray, a welter of unregistered private rights lasting far longer than patents and
easier to obtain than patents would be awarded over utilitarian subject matters
regardless of whether they met patentable standards. Baker v. Selden marks the
place where resistance to the confluence of patent and copyright law first took
mature form.66
Prior to that 1880 decision, designers of systems who could somehow
ground those systems in graphic art had plausible claims to copyright. For
copyright." Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107. But much of the opinion leans toward a less
sweeping invalidation.

65

This fear was expressed by the Oracle II court. Oracle 750 F.3d at 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

66

In my analysis of Baker, I am indebted to the work of Pamela Samuelson, particularly Pamela
Samuelson, Symposium: Frontiers of intellectual Property: Why Copyright Law Excludes
Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1921 (hereinafter
“Systems and Processes”); and Pamela Samuelson, Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction
between Authorship and Invention, in Intellectual Property Stories (Jane C. Ginsburg and
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006).
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example, some years before Baker¸ a case arose involving copyright in dressmaker
patterns.67 (Dressmaker patterns are two-dimensional paper drawings meant to be
pinned on fabric to guide a tailor’s shears.)68 The plaintiff successfully enjoined
unauthorized garment patterns that, though not identical, achieved the “same
result” in terms of producing the same finished clothing.69
In 1880 that changed. After Baker v. Selden, courts continually rejected
efforts to argue that similarity in system and practical result70 could justify a
judgment of copyright infringement.71
3.2. Baker and “merger”
The “merger” doctrine aims to preserve the public’s liberty to use abstract
ideas by preventing copyright from arising in a work of expression that is one of
67

Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.S.D. 1862)

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

After discussing various similarities and differences in appearance, as between plaintiff’s work
and defendant’s, the court in Drury opined:
But there is one fact that seems wholly conclusive on this question of identity, and dispenses
with the necessity of a minute inquiry into the alleged discrepancies between the two plans.
Some nine or ten witnesses, practical and intelligent dressmakers, well acquainted with the
theory and practice of taking measurements, and cutting dresses upon the plan of these parties,
testify that the two are substantially the same, and in practice produce the same result. Some of
these witnesses swear they have cut dresses by both plans, and that when the directions of each
are strictly pursued, the results are substantially the same.
… Mrs. Ewing has, with some adroitness, so arranged and transposed some parts of Mrs. Drury’s
diagrams as to present to the unexperienced eye the impression that they are dissimilar, but in
doing this she has utterly failed to prove that there is any difference in the principle of the two.
Drury, 7 F. Cas. at 1117 (emphasis added).
71

See, e.g., the cases reviewed infra at Section __.
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very few ways to convey the abstraction. If few or no alternative forms exist, then
the particular form of expression is said to “merge” with the unprotectable idea,
and the expression too becomes incapable of being owned under copyright law.
“Merger” is a troublesome doctrine, but it has some legitimacy when
employed to keep copyright from locking up general and abstract ideas. The
Oracle court took “merger” and applied it instead to functional innovation.
Because the contested elements of the Java program could have been written in
alternative ways, the Federal Circuit held, those elements were capable of
sustaining a copyright.72
The Federal Circuit is not alone in using the possibility of alternatives to
justify giving non-patent protection to a functional innovation. Yet the application
of “merger” in such contexts is neither mandated nor explicitly approved by any
legislation, and no court has articulated a clear rationale for taking the step.
Further, much U.S. legislation and precedent would seem to weigh against
seeing “merger” and its inquiry into “alternatives” as an appropriate tool for
defining appropriate borders between copyright and patent law. For example,
consider the requirements for protection in the law of utility patent.
Patent
applicants must show “utility,” “novelty,” and ‘non-obviousness,” but applicants
need not prove that their invention is superior to other ways of accomplishing a
goal.73 The presence of “alternatives” does not doom eligibility for federal patent
protection.
Patents exist in many different riding lawn-mowers, for example, without
any of the manufacturers needing to prove that their own mower possesses

72

Oracle II at 1361.
See, e.g., 1-4 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 4.01 (2015) (“To comply with the utility requirement, an
invention need not be superior to existing products or processes.”).
73
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elements so unique that no other product can serve as an adequate alternative.
Sometimes, therefore, simply being different can suffice for a patent.74
This is a sensible decision for Congress to have made. Judgments of product
superiority or uniqueness are vulnerable, 75 and characteristics that make an
innovation merely different today might make it uniquely important later.
Monetary value, for example, is largely a matter of context, so that price and cost
attributable to varying combinations of elements will alter over time as constraints
and needs alter.
From the fact that Congress permits patents to be granted in innovations that
have alternatives, it would seem to follow that such innovations have at least some

74

Some qualifications are in order. For example, in determining whether or not an innovation is
non-obvious, courts sometimes use look to secondary evidence such as whether others in the
field have long failed to “solve the problem.” Id. at § 5.05. Other secondary criteria include,
inter alia, length of unmet need, or (most controversially) the presence of commercial success.
Id. As a matter of logic, an innovation with no existing alternatives will do better on measures
like ‘unmet need’ and ‘unsolved problem’ than can an innovation that already has alternatives on
the market. Similarly, an innovation that may not have alternatives on the market now, but for
which potential alternatives can be easily imagined, may well fare poorly on measures such as
commercial success. The presence of actual or potential alternatives may, therefore, make some
kind of difference to the likelihood that a patent will be awarded.
75
Thus, the Tenth Circuit argues:
[T]he framers of the patent system did not require an inventor to demonstrate an
invention's superiority to existing products in order to qualify for a patent. That they did
not do so tells us that the patent system seeks not only superior inventions but also a
multiplicity of inventions. A variety of choices is more likely to satisfy the desires of a
greater number of consumers than is a single set of products deemed “optimal” in some
average sense by patent examiners and/or judges. And the ability to intermingle and
extrapolate from many inventors' solutions to the same problem is more likely to lead to
further technological advances than is a single, linear approach seeking to advance one
“superior” line of research and development.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1508 (10th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1067 (1996).
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significance.76 If so, it is quite arguable that the law should avoid undermining
innovators’ willingness to embrace the costly patent system (with its rigorous
standards, disclosure requirements, and short duration) for such innovations. The
patent system loses much of its appeal if an innovator can bypass it to employ a
regime like copyright. (Although an owner’s rights under copyright are a bit less
strong than an owner’s rights under patent law, copyright is still tempting: 77
copyrights are granted for immensely long terms of private control, are largely free
of required requirement of disclosure,78 and arise under fairly easy standards of
acquisition.) In addition, many of Congress’s decisions, such as the patent rule that
only ‘novel’ and ‘non-obvious’ functional innovations should be privatized,79 will
be disregarded if courts uphold copyrights in common and obvious functional
variations.

77

Some readers may object that this should be parsed more closely. They might point out, for
example, that the Supreme Court has indicated that, for innovations clearly ineligible for patents,
allowing states to provide alternative routes to privatization would neither reduce the number of
federal patent applications nor the amount of disclosure produced by the federal patent system.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470, 485 (1974) (refusing to pre-empt state trade
secrecy law). Kewanee’s logic is, however, questionable on its own terms and inapplicable here.
One of the difficulties with Kewanee’s interior logic is the real possibility that diminishing the
level of disclosure produced by the patent office might be a lesser problem than the impairment
of free competition resulting from non-patent protection. If so, asking how state protections
would impact on the number of federal patent applicants would be beside the main point.
More importantly for this chapter is that Kewanee’s focus on the differential likelihoods of
patenting various innovations is largely irrelevant to the “merger” search for alternatives.
Whether or not an innovation has alternatives does not directly correlate with whether or not the
innovation could obtain a federal utility patent.
78
All patent applications must disclose their inventions. Copyright Office regulations, by
contrast, allow the registrants of computer software to hide most of the code from public view.
See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1509.1(C) (4) (b) (3d ed. 2014) (Computer Programs
That Contain Trade Secret Material).
79
The dangers of too much privatization include, inter alia, excessive deadweight loss, and this
cost applies to innovations whether or not they are potentially patentable.
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3.3 Patent law is a jealous monarch
In several cases construing the pre-emptive reach of federal patent law, the
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a functional configuration that is known to the
public and is unprotected by utility patent or design patent should not be able to
find protection under the wings of non-patent regimes.80 Functional products that
patent law does not protect (whether because a product fails to meet standards such
as nonobviousness or novelty,81 or because its patent has expired82) become
governed by the patent public domain, and in that domain, patent law gives rights
“to copy and to use”.83 It is as if patent law were a monarch who has declared that
any product she has freed must remain free of subordinate sovereigns as well.
To crown patent law the chief monarch over functionality makes
considerable sense. Federal copyright84 and federal trademark law85 both contain
80

At first the courts spoke as if patent and copyright were to be given similarly broad preemptive effect. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 238 (1964)
(“ when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to
copy that article.”) Over time, however, the patent and copyright cases were given different
treatment. Although in many areas the patent statute was understood to have drawn “a balance”
between protection and public domain to which states were required to defer, the 1909 Copyright
Act by contrast was interpreted as leaving significant topics as to which “Congress has drawn no
balance.” Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 570- 71 (1973) (declining to pre-empt California
provision that prohibited the copying of sound recordings).
81
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226, n.1 (1964) (reiterating a District Court
finding that Stiffel’s lamp patent was “invalid for want of invention”—a holding that Stiffel did
not challenge on appeal).
82
TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 25 (2001) (configuration for which trade
dress protection was sought had been previously been protected by patent).
83
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 153 (1989) (quoting Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 367 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).)
84
In the copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) puts systems, methods of operation, and
processes fully outside copyright protection; in other provisions (such as § 113(b), or the
definition of PGS work in § 101), the statute actively prevents copyrights from arising, or
deprives copyright owners of otherwise-applicable rights, where copyright could interfere with
patent law’s public domain.
85
Under the federal Lanham Act, trademarks cannot be functional; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(e),
1125(a) (3) (2012). The language is not self-defining, however, and many courts distinguish
between ‘de jure functionality” which permits protection under the Lanham Act, and “de facto”
26
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provisions that decline to protect functional innovations and designs. Moreover, it
is in the patent statutes that Congress seems to have embodied its most attentive
consideration to questions of how functional innovations should be treated.
I concede that this ‘jealous monarch’ view of patent law is not
unanimously held, particularly in regard to patent/copyright relations. First, the
Supremacy Clause undergirds the pre-emption cases, and the Clause is irrelevant to
interactions between two federal regimes like copyright and patent.86 Second, the
copyright and trademark statutes have been interpreted in various ways, sometimes
but not consistently hostile to courts that inquire into a functional product’s
“alternatives”87 en route to deciding whether or not to allow non-patent protection.
So the monarchal view of patent law does not reign unopposed within courts
interpreting its sister statutes. Third, pre-emption cases themselves fluctuate in the
strength they attribute to patent’s public domain.88
Nevertheless, the pre-emption cases have a clear central line of argument,
and the federal statutes for both copyright and trademark consistently defer to
patent law for reasons best explained (in terms of both logic and history) by the
same approach: namely, that only through patent law should duties be imposed that
require the public not to duplicate or sell innovative functional products. After all,
functionality that just happens to exist. The Supreme Court’s most recent opinion on the topic,
TrafFix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001), sensibly ignores the labels of de jure and
de facto functionality, and in so doing seems to unite the two categories. The TrafFix Court held
that the possibility of alternative product shapes could not justify giving federal trade dress
protection to a shape that was otherwise functional. Id. at 25.
86

Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (Florida statute prohibiting
certain modes of copying boat designs held inconsistent with the patent public domain and thus
pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause).
87
The Supreme Court has criticized using an inquiry into ‘alternatives’ to decide whether a
product shape is ineligible for protection under federal trademark law, TrafFix Devices v. Mktg.
Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001), and the Federal Circuit has resisted. See section 11.2.1, supra.
88
Compare for example the breadth of pre-emptive sweep in Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (pre-empting state protection for certain trade dress) with the
convoluted logic of Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470, 485 (1974) (not preempting state protection for trade secrets.)
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non-patent laws that privatize intellectual products have potential to undermine
patent law’s balance between competition and monopoly whether the laws are
federal or state.
In the pre-emption area, at least one classic case makes it clear that state
protection is forbidden not only for unique advances, but also for products that
have alternatives. Thus, the Supreme Court wrote:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made
in some other way, that the design is . . . not essential to the use
of either article, . . . that there may be 'confusion' among
purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is the
maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law
requiring such precautions as labeling; however, and regardless
of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others can
furnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the
actual acts of copying and selling.89
This approach to the patent public domain leaves no room for a
doctrine like “merger”.
Conceivably, a justification could be constructed for restricting the logic of
the pre-emption cases to assessing solely the validity of state laws. The
justification might also stretch to defending the practice of courts’ employing
“merger” to justify privatizing functional but unpatented products under federal
copyright and federal trademark laws. Perhaps one could argue, for example, that
patent law’s public domain should defer more to cognate federal laws (such as
federal copyright and federal trademark) than it does to states’ attempts to create
89

Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). The Supreme Court has
admittedly withdrawn from some of the statements in Compco and its companion case Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). In my view the later cases do not impair the
core policy of requiring other laws to respect patent law’s limits on protection. The most difficult
case for my position is Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U. S. 470 (1974), but its result is
explicable: I think that in Kewanee trade secrecy survived the pre-emption attack for reasons not
rooted in logic but in practical administration of the law: it was obvious that Congress had not
intended to create such a significant disruption in local commercial law.
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intellectual property. But such an argument would need to go much further than
pointing out that the Supremacy Clause has no purchase over intra-federal
relations; such a formalistic reply would ignore the fact that when ether federal or
state law grants exclusivity in functional products outside of patent, those grants
can have very serious real world effects.
In sum: patent law makes nothing turn on the difference between
innovations that have alternatives and those that do not, and copyright and
trademark states both defer to patent law. Therefore it should at least surprise us
when a court allows copyright or trademark claims to arise in an original or
distinctive functional product simply because the product passes something like a
“merger” test of having competitive alternatives. But that is what the Oracle court
did, and it is what other courts sometimes do as well.
The historic origins of this practice cannot be fully untangled here.
Nevertheless the instant chapter does hope to accomplish two things. The first
goal is to make vivid why it is problematic for courts to use the search for
alternatives as if were a sensible or natural tool – one that needs no explanation or
justification-- to resolve tensions between patent law and other cognate doctrines. I
hope that goal has been accomplished.
The second goal to make clear that the legal community should stop
attributing to Baker the mess that is “merger.” It is to that task that the chapter
now turns.
3.4

Baker v. Selden neither gave birth to, nor legitimates, the use of “merger” in
the context of functionality
To recap: The "merger" doctrine aims to preserve the public’s liberty to use
ideas by preventing copyright from arising in a work of expression that is one of
very few ways to convey the abstraction. "Merger" is the basic approach used by
the Oracle court; because the programs might have done their work if written
differently, the Federal Circuit upheld their copyrightability. This misapplication
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of “merger” results in part from the way that some jurists, perhaps including some
on the Federal Circuit, 90 see Baker v. Selden as the foundation for “merger.”
But that reading blurs the line between the reasons why no copyright can
inhere in ‘abstract ideas’ (which merger addresses) and why no copyright can
inhere in ‘functional systems’ (which are addressed by Baker and a host of ‘useful
article’ and ‘functionality’ doctrines). Regarding abstract ideas, copyright puts
them in the public domain for virtually all purposes, but as for systems and
methods of operation, copyright ‘channels’ them toward patent law.91 Under
Baker, patent law and its ‘rights to copy and to use’92 unpatented innovations seem
to have a particularly strong magnetic force.
Admittedly the Baker v. Selden opinion contains language about the
'necessity' of using Selden's forms -- language which some have interpreted as the
Court assuming that few alternative accounting forms would do the job. But the
relevant passage is not a finding of fact, and is best explicable on purely rhetorical
grounds.93 More importantly, the same passage indicates that even 'necessary'
90

Oracle II at 1355.

91

For a useful discussion of pitfalls and opportunities in current methods of channeling IP
producers to different legal doctrines, see Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to
Channeling?, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 873 (2009).
92

This language, while applicable in spirit, I quote from a case decided much later than Baker.
Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989).
93

It is true that the Baker opinion said that “where the art [that a book] teaches cannot be used
without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to
them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and
given therewith to the public.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1800). That language is
sometimes interpreted to indicate that the Court believed that few or no alternatives existed to the
plaintiff’s accounting form. But that language was not a factual finding.
Rather, it was a reply to the earlier claim by plaintiff’s lawyer that his client owned the system
precisely because (he alleged) the forms were necessary to the system’s use. (“It is contended [by
plaintiff] that he has secured such exclusive right because no one can use the system without
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forms will be infringed when they are copied in "publication in other works
explanatory of the art." 94 The passage therefore is not addressing copyrightability
at all.
Whether or not the 'merger' doctrine is capable of safeguarding the public
domain status of abstract ideas, abstract ideas were not the Court's concern in
Baker. As intimated above, abstract ideas and patentable inventions lie outside
copyright for non-identical sets of reasons. The Baker Court's concern was to keep
an overgenerous application of copyright law from undermining inventors' reasons
to seek the protection of patent law. Congress had not chosen copyright (with its
long term and ease of acquisition) to govern functional innovation; Congress gave
that task to patent law, a realm marked by short duration, requirements of
disclosure, and high standards that a government agent needed to be persuaded
were satisfied.95

using substantially the same ruled lines and headings which he was appended to his books in
illustration of it. In other words, it is contended that the ruled lines and headings, given to
illustrate the system, are a part of the book, and as such are secured by the copyright, and that no
one can make or use similar ruled lines and headings, or ruled lines and headings made and
arranged on substantially the same system, without violating the copyright.” Id. at 101).
As I see it, the Court was merely turning the copyright claimant’s rhetoric on its head. The
claimant’s lawyer had pointed to an alleged interdependence of the accounting system and the
accounting forms. The lawyer had argued that the forms (a set of drawings) were necessary to
the system, and that therefore the drawings’ eligibility for copyright should make copyright
apply to the system as well. The Court replied in kind. If such interdependence existed, the
Court ruled, such that the drawings were necessary to the system, then it was the system’s
ineligibility for copyright that would apply to both.
For other reasons why the “merger” interpretation of Baker is incorrect, the best guide is Pamela
Samuelson, whose scholarship is cited throughout below.
94

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103

95
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4. Defining "Explanation" and "Use"
The discussion to this point has suggested that, under Baker, the owners of
copyright in literary and graphic works cannot employ their rights to control all
forms of copying. Some copying is functional, and lies within the public’s freedom
of action unless restrained by some law other than copyright. Thus a copyright
owner can have rights against some copying but not others: a liberty to copy can be
given the public "for the purpose of practical application. …"96, while, by contrast,
copying done "for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the
art"97 could result in infringement. This dichotomy between infringing and
noninfringing uses98 has of course become known as the “use/explanation”
distinction or the “use/explanation” doctrine.
The “use/explanation” nomenclature is fairly unhelpful. Everything done
with a copyrighted work is in some sense a “use,” so the “use” half of the term is
less a description than a gesture: a hand waved toward the realm of utility patents.
As for the other half of the phrase, “explanation,” copying for explanation is
obviously exemplary rather than exhaustive of the many kinds of copying behavior
that copyright law can legitimately regulate. Scholars sometimes use the term
“non-functional” to label the behaviors that copyright can regulate without
imperiling patent law. (This chapter also sometimes employs “non-functional” in
this way.)

96

101 U.S. 103.

97

Id.

98

This dichotomy could be equivalently expressed. Where an owner has rights against copying,
the public has duties-not-to-copy (for ‘duties’ are correlative to ‘rights’); where an owner lacks
rights against copying, the public has a privilege or liberty to copy (for liberties are correlative to
an absence of exclusive right in opposing parties). This vocabulary, which can be quite useful,
finds its origin with Hohfeld. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays (1919).
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But “non-functional”, too, is mere term-of-art shorthand and, in the end,
inaccurate in the context of ordinary language. Behaviors unquestionably within
copyright’s legitimate sphere (such as copying a work verbatim into one's blog)
can serve “functions” such as educating one’s readers, or advertising one’s own
skills, that are as important as many “functions” served by patented inventions.
So what are the behaviors beyond “explanation” that can properly controlled
by copyright? Baker has some suggestive answers, as does the contemporary
copyright statute.
First, regarding literary or graphic works that convey the “teachings of
science,” Baker tells us that it is only use of the expressive aspect that copyright
can enforce. When scientific and practical teachings are "embodied and taught in a
literary composition or book, their essence consists only in their statement. This
alone is what is secured by the copyright. The use by another of the same methods
of statement, whether in words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching the
art would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright."99 Legislative history
tells us that Congress considered “expressiveness” the basis for copyright even for
computer programs.100 So a use on the copyright side of the line is a use that draws
on the expressive aspects of a work.

99

Id. at 104 (emphasis added).

100

When Congress adopted copyright for computer programs, expressiveness was key. To quote
from the legislative history, using emphasis supplied by the Oracle I court:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection
to the methodology or processes adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the “writing”
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the
expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and
that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the
copyright law.
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The Baker opinion also provides some helpful examples. Not only can
copyright infringement result from copying for “publication in other works
explanatory of the art”,101 the Court tells us; infringement also can arise as a result
of copying the “lines of the poet or the historian’s periods”102 and from copying

Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the
present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of
copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.
H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 56–7 (1976) (emphasis added).
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2012) rev’d and remanded,
750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis altered; footnote omitted).
This reliance on expressiveness also appears in the rationale for the 1980 amendments. The
recommendations on which Congress relied in 1980 depended on the division between “the
copyrightable element of style and expression in a computer program and the process which
underlies it.” Final Report of the National Commission on New Technology Uses of Copyrighted
Works (hereinafter, “CONTU”) (1978) at 22. In 1980, Congress essentially adopted the CONTU
recommendations.
101

Id at 104–5.

102

Id. at 104.

Robert Bone has suggested that the Baker court was trying to distinguish between different kinds
of works – those susceptible only to expression-oriented behaviors of the kinds with which
copyright has traditionally been concerned, and those works that are susceptible to functional
application of the kinds with which that patent law has traditionally been concerned. It is
possible that, as Professor Bone suggests, the Court may be making a teleological subject-matter
distinction here, namely, that works of a particular type (poetry, history, pictures “addressed to
the taste”) simply have no conceivable “functions” or “uses” about which patent law should be
concerned. But even so, the Court’s root concern would seem to be with types of use.
One need not go so far as to eliminate copyrightability in order to shelter the public’s freedom to
use functional aspects of a copyrighted work in a functional way.
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works of authorship whose only goal is to serve aesthetic “taste”103 or the
“production of pleasure in the [] contemplation” of “form.”104
So it does not count as utilitarian "use" to produce pleasure through
aesthetics and contemplation. To produce pleasure through designing a tickling
machine would be another story.
It can be as difficult to define what counts as a patent-type "use" as it was
to define a copyright-type "explanation". Yet it is important to identify what kinds
of purposes (described with whatever specificity is possible) might suffice to
activate patent's magnetic force so strongly that patent's influence makes an act of
reproduction noninfringing under copyright law.
We might start by distinguishing expressive from non-expressive uses.105
However, Baker does not address all nonexpressive uses; Baker addresses only one
subset, namely, copying behavior that lies within the domain of patent law's proper
concern. Does patent law provide answers? Unfortunately not; patent law's notion
of 'utility' is too vague to assist and hardly self-defining. Is there some other
source of criteria for identifying patent-type "use", or for identifying (something
not quite its converse) the kind of "use" for which copyright is not the proper
regulator?

103

Baker, 101 U.S. at 104.

104

The Court noted, “[T]hese observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or
pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their
essence, and their object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation.” Baker, 101 U.S.at
103–4 (1880).
105

By contrast, Abraham Drassinower's view of Baker does begin with a distinction between
communicative and non-communicative use. See the discussion of Drassinower's view infra at
___.
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One potential source is the contemporary statutory concept of “useful
article.” The phrase and its definition appear in the 1976 Copyright Act.
106

Coming into the mid-seventies, Congress was considering the latest of a
series of copyright reform bills. When the House received the bill containing what
soon became the new Copyright Act, part of the bill ("Title II") was a set of sui
generis rules granting design protection for 'applied art' such as the attractive
design of autos, appliances and furniture. The House jettisoned Title II. It did so in
part because of concerns about monopoly.107
The entitlements given by Copyright are even stronger than the sui
generis right that Congress had declined to create, and thus copyright posed more
danger of monopoly than the rejected right. It is natural that the Copyright Act of
1976 would thus leave, as it did, a wide moat of public-domain liberty around
objects that meld form and function. This public-protective ring is embodied not
only through narrowing the copyrightability of PGS useful articles.108 The statute
106

17 USC section 202 (definition of 'useful article') (2012).

107

In dropping the design-protection portion of the bill, Title II, the House Report gave among
its reasons the following:
"[T]he Committee will have to examine further the assertion of the Department of Justice, which
testified in opposition to the Title, that Title II would create a new monopoly which has not been
justified by a showing that its benefits will outweigh the disadvantage of removing such designs
from free public use."
H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476 (hereinafter “1976 House Report”) at 49-50 (1976), available at
www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf.

108

Useful articles that seek protection as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (“PGS” works)
must meet a demanding “separability” test:
[t]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic,
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also limits the exclusive rights that attach to any copyrights that portray useful
articles- the copyright owner's rights do not control what Baker called "use".109
We might, accordingly, find some hints to fill out Baker's distinction
between “use” and “explanation” in the current statute’s definition of “useful
article.” The definition reads as follows:

or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works”).
In my view, the “best” account of separability is that advanced by Paul Goldstein. The key, as he
indicates, is whether forbidding competitors to copy the copyrighted portion of the useful article
will make the utilitarian aspects of the item less useful. For example, will removing the
“aesthetic” component made the object do its task less well, or make the object more expensive
to manufacture? If so, the component is not “separable.” If removing it makes no utilitarian
difference, however, then it is “separable.” See Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 2.5.3 (physical
separability exits if the sculptural feature “can be physically separated from the article without
impairing the article’s utility and if, once separated, it can stand alone as a work of art
traditionally conceived,” id. at page 2.75; conceptual separability arises when a feature “can
stand alone as a work of art traditionally conceived, and if the useful article in which it is
embodied would be equally useful without it.” Id. at page 2:78.1.)
In some of its cases the Second Circuit has implemented this perspective: explicitly or implicitly
asking whether the useful article’s functions can be equally well served were the object denuded
of the portion in which copyright is claimed. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.,
773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985).
109

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § §113 (b) and 113 (c); 102(b) (2012). Subsection 113(b), discussed at
further length infra at __, provides in essence that “the copyright in a work portraying a useful
article as such would not protect against manufacture of that article.” Report of the Register of
Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14, available at
http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. Also see 1976 House Report at 109,
available at www.copyright.gov/history/law/clrev_94-1476.pdf.
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A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.110
According to this definition, it is apparently a copyright–appropriate use “to
portray appearance” (or, presumably to portray any pattern of form to any sense,
whether the form be, e.g., a pattern of colors, a pattern of sounds, or a pattern of
dance steps). Similarly, “to convey information” is also a presumptively copyrightappropriate use. Functions beyond "appearance" and "information" lean in the
patent direction. Although PGS works are especially singled out for special
copyrightability hurdles 111 that do not apply to useful articles packaged in nonPGS formats, the definition is at least suggestive; it suggests that any function
beyond "appearance" and "information" might be ripe for being classified as none
of copyright's business.
Copyright scholars are accustomed to drawing a sharp line between 'useful
articles' that are pictorial, graphic or sculptural works ("PGS" works), on the one
hand, and, on the other, the many other kinds of functional-but-expressive
creations that appear in non-PGS parts of the copyright statute. Given legislative
history the distinction between PGS works and other works makes sense when

110

17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The statute gives force to the “useful article” concept most obviously
in regard to Pictorial, Graphic and Sculptural ("PGS") works: useful articles that seek copyright
under the PGS category must pass a separability test, section 101, and the derivative work right
attaching to a copyrighted PGS work that depicts a useful articles is narrow will not cover the
making of the functional articles depicted, section 113(b).
More controversially, "useful article" has application in regard to functional use more generally,
pursuant to a broad but plausible reading of 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012). The broad reading of
Subsection 113(b) is discussed further infra at __.
111

The statute gives PGS works that serve functions beyond "appearance" and "information"
rough treatment when it comes to copyrightability. Useful PGS works must pass a 'separability'
test, as discussed ___ infra.
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copyrightability is on the table.112 However, when 'scope of right' rather than
copyrightability is the issue, Congress has not drawn such a sharp line.113 All
functional-but-expressive creations owe a conflicting allegiance to both copyright
and to patent; they share many common policies; it may be time for 'useful' PGS
works and other 'useful' works to learn something from each other.
The Baker-type cases cited in copyright legislative history are in fact
consistent with what became the 1976 definition of "useful article".114 These cases
refuse to impose liability for making a copy or derivative work that does more than
portray "appearance" or convey "information"-- that is, the cases give an immunity
for any version of the copyrighted work that actually functions.
Thus, to manufacture furniture,115 lamps,116 or gears117 copied from
copyrighted graphics in a competitor’s catalogue does not infringe the copyrights.

112

:[A]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically satisfying and valuable,
the Committee's intention is not to offer it copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape
of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any other industrial
product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable
from the utilitarian' aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill."
1976 HOUSE REPORT at 55.
113

See especially the discussion of section 113(b), infra at text accompanying notes ___.

114

These were cited in regard to what became section 113, as discussed infra at __>

115

Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 F. 474 (W.D. Mich. 1889) (defendant alleged
to have manufactured church furniture depicted in another entity’s copyrighted catalog and to be
publishing as advertisements graphics showing its 'own' furniture that virtually duplicated the
plaintiff's original photos; motion seeking preliminary injunction denied.)
116

Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (no infringement results
from making lamps identical to those appearing in a copyrighted catalog). The case does not
really assist in fleshing out section 113(b), however, since the plaintiff seemed to claim no
authorship in the lamp designs that were photographed. If the plaintiff's originality subsisted
only in choice of photographic angles and such, a defendant who built the objects depicted in the
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It also does not infringe to build a highway/bridge interchange based on a
copyrighted drawing of an original road design.118 These noninfringing acts of
reproduction are all uses that go beyond “conveying information” and “portraying”
form; they are on the "use" side of the Baker divide. Similarly, cases that did
impose infringement verdicts (i.e., those on the 'explanation' side of the Baker
divide) involved defendants whose purposes involved only 'information' or
'appearance'.
Thus, it did infringe to build a memorial119 based on a copyrighted
sculpture. Memorial stones only convey information (such as naming who is
buried beneath, reproducing lines of poetry, conveying descriptions and dates) and
portray appearance.
Similarly, to make a doll120 based on a copyrighted comic did infringe. This
too fits the 'useful article' definition; stuffed dolls are not 'useful' because they
photo would have used nothing of what made the photos copyrightable. In such a case,
infringement would not attach whether or not the objects depicted were 'useful'.
117

In PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), the
defendant’s catalogs copied illustrations of gears from the Plaintiff’s catalogs. It appears that the
plaintiff had designed the gears, though no inquiry into their originality was made. The court
noted that “The component parts so pictured in all the catalogs before us are in the public domain
and plaintiff has no exclusive right to produce and illustrate them. It is the illustration that is
protected, not the object itself.” Id. at 110.
118

Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (copying a
drawing of a highway/bridge interchange by building such a roadway does not infringe copyright
in the drawing).
119

A memorial stone is not a useful article; it merely portrays appearance (e.g., angel wings) and
conveys information (about the deceased.) To copy someone else's art in a memorial can
therefore infringe. Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731 (M.D. Pa. 1936)
(memorial copied from a photograph was held infringing).
120

King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1924) (defendant infringed by
making a three-dimensional doll from plaintiff’s two-dimensional cartoon horse “Sparky”). The
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employ only the copied work’s form and “appearance”. Today's Copyright Office
does not consider dolls and other toys to be 'useful articles.'121
There is of course no prescience in the old case decisions; the judges were
not seeking to anticipate and apply the 'useful article' definition from the 1976 Act.
To the contrary, any causal relation ran in the ordinary temporal direction. The
pre-1976 cases just mentioned are based on Baker v Selden, and those decisions
along with Baker are part of the source from which the 1976 definitional principle
drew its legitimacy. The Justice Department's anti-monopoly position too was
hardly born the moment Congress heard it; the anti-monopoly strains in IP law are
rooted
4.1 Tentative Conclusion: Interoperability and Baker
Returning to Oracle v. Google, it is indisputable that computer programs do
more than “portray form” and “convey information.” They make machines work,
and when someone copies code, the copies are typically sold to people for the
purpose of making other machines work. While neither of these facts about the use
of computer programs is sufficient to resolve the Oracle case, they remind us
computer code may be a 'useful article' and that like all useful articles,
considerations of patent deference can and should play a strong role.
As mentioned, Baker indicates that expressive use is the kind of use which
copyright law can legitimately regulate.122 Copying an entire copyrighted computer
court imposed liability by finding a parallel between “the production of pleasure in
contemplation,” mentioned in Baker v. Selden as a legitimate copyright purpose, and the ability
of Sparky to produce “pleasure in amusement.” Also see Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Freundlich,
Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the Betty Boop doll).
121

From cases like this arose the current rule treating stuffed animals and dolls as art and not as
useful articles. Toys and stuffed animals are typically not considered "useful articles".
Compendium II of Copyright Office Practices at 502, available at
http://www.copyrightcompendium.com/#500
122
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program will of necessity make use of both expressive and nonexpressive
aspects,123 and using the copy – even using it to run a machine – could therefore
infringe. Where any possibility exists that the defendant saved herself some
expressive effort, and that obtaining this advantage played a nontrivial role in
motivating the copying, it is not as clear that Baker will shelter her behavior.124
But copying that is done solely to achieve interoperability (with other
programs or with previously acquired utilitarian skill) is fully indifferent to the
copied program’s expressive aspects. This is true both for interoperability between
the copied program and the copier’s program, as in Lotus v. Borland, or
interoperability between the copier’s program and third-party programs, as in
Oracle v. Google. What matters for interoperability is not the quality of expression,
but exact conformity.
If it is correct that uses indifferent to expression cannot infringe, then a
proper resolution of Oracle and Lotus is clear. In neither case would the copying
infringe.

123

Were a program to lack any expressive content, it could not have copyright in the first
instance.
Whether expression in a program ever “really” exists (in the ordinary-language sense of) or
whether Congress conclusively deems it to exist (in the sense of a mandatory legal fiction) is a
question this chapter does not address. Many scholars have addressed the inherent conceptual
instability caused by Congress including computer programs among the categories of potentially
copyrightable subject matter. See, e.g., Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 1149 (1998).
124

The touchstone examples in Baker involve no use of expressiveness: the medicines made by
reading a book, the mechanical skills learned from a book … none copy or use the book’s mode
of “statement” which Baker teaches is the aspect to which copyright attaches. See __ supra.
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This result does not turn on the value or disvalue of lock-in as a social or
economic practice.125 A logically prior matter is whether an instance of copying is
related or unrelated to the copied material’s expressivity. And copying to avoid
lock-in certainly seems to be unrelated to expression. When having a key made,
one doesn’t care if the key is clunky or beautiful. Its elegance as a sculptural
artifact is irrelevant.
All that matters is that it fits the lock.
4.2 Juridical Integrity and Lack of “Fit”
My contention, that copying for interoperability does not infringe, cuts less
broadly than may seem. To better see this, it will be helpful to examine and
distinguish the perspective that Abraham Drassinower brings to Baker v. Selden.
In Professor Drassinower’s view, Baker demonstrates that nonexpressive,
noncommunicative forms of copying should count as “nonuse,”126 a behavior
outside the copyright statutes, and thus not actionable under copyright law.127 Only
125

Overstating the importance of lock-in economics to the Oracle case is a mistake the Solicitor
General made in his opposition to certiorari. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014), available at
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/osg/briefs/2015/06/01/14410_google_v_oracle_us_cvsg_brief.pdf.
126

ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (Harvard University Press, 2015)
(hereinafter “Drassinower”), at 13 (“[In Baker, t]he defendant used the forms as a tool but not as
a work, and was therefore not liable in copyright… Baker thus turns on a crucial distinction
between the work as a communicative act and its material form as its physical embodiment. Use
of the physical embodiment for noncommunicative purposes does not give rise to liability.”).
127

Drassinower emphasizes that copyright would have reached the accounting form in Baker if it
had been copied as part of an explanatory book, or copied for other reasons relating to its
expressive, authorial qualities. The defendant however copied the form for reasons relating to its
inventive qualities. The set of lines changed role from “work of authorship” to “tool” –resulting
in a lack of fit’ with copyright, and defendant was not liable. Id. at 100.
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when a work is used expressively, as a communication, Drassinower argues, can
the use give rise to copyright infringement. It’s not that Drassinower argues that
patent’s public domain has “trumping” power, or that giving patent-like power to
copyrights is socially costly; his argument is rather that copyright has no role
beyond its proper (communicatory) sphere.
While I cannot agree with all of Professor Drassinower’s contentions, I find
an immensely useful starting point in Drassinower’s observation that mere
mechanical repetition of a particular physical or audible form does not always use
the work as a work.128 Sometimes, for example, it is being used as a tool
(functionally) or as a fact (as evidence in a courtroom) or for some other purpose
whose value does not depend on the work's expressiveness.
We all know how a person can change roles, and that different roles (spouse,
employer, enemy combatant) can trigger different rights and duties both socially
and under law. Similarly, a given configuration of words (or symbols, sounds,
shapes, lines or colors) can have different roles in different contexts.
A new role can change the configuration’s legal significance – either
because copyright is juridically concerned only with one role, namely,
communication (as Drassinower might have it)129, or because the new role alters
the work’s economic and social impact (as policy analysts might have it).
For an example of changing roles for a copyrighted work, consider a love
letter introduced into evidence in a divorce proceeding. In the litigation context the
letter’s eloquence as a work of authorship is irrelevant; the literary work has
become a fact, valued not for its beauty in language but for what it implies,
factually, about the relationship between sender and receiver. The same
copyrightable letter, now serving as a fact rather than as expression, under current
128

Id. at 102 (arguing that it is an error to see “any and all uses of a work’s material form” as
“uses of the work.”)
129
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law can be freely copied for evidentiary purposes in litigation.130 It is a “fair
use.”131
There are reasons for granting private rights in the first instance, and rights
should not be exercised for reasons that lie far afield. Functional uses, like
evidentiary uses, do not reward quality of expression; they do not “fit.”
If crafting exceptions to the public’s duty-not-to-copy were costless and
perfectly predictable, lack of fit standing alone would always suffice as ground for
sheltering a defendant’s activity. Instead, the process consumes some
governmental and private resources, probably increases uncertainty (in both
markets and everyday non-commercial behaviors), and might make unlawful
copying and litigation a bit more likely.132 Rule of Law values such as
predictability might be poorly served by case-by-case insistence on “fit.”
Lack of “fit” in a particular instance shows merely that enforcement will fail
to further a particular law's goals. Courts often want a showing that, in addition,
refusing to enforce will achieve some affirmative public advantage. They want
something that can outweigh the extra costs involved in case-by-case recrafting of
the rules.
For an example, consider negligence law. It uses the “proximate cause”
doctrine to immunize defendants from liability when the harm they cause is
130

Copying for courtroom purposes is seen as a “fair use,” recognized by cases such as Den
Hollander v. Steinberg, 419 Fed. Appx. 44 (2d Cir. 2011).
131

Id. It would be more accurate to say that works of authorship become “facts” when copied for
evidentiary purposes; unfortunately, however, clear statement about these cases is inhibited by
the Supreme Court’s odd ontological assertion that “facts” are “found” and never “created.” Feist
Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Svc. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (“facts do not owe their origin
to an act of authorship.”) On this latter point, see Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From
Feist to Fair Use, 55 L. Contemp. Probs. 93 (1992).
132

Conceivably each case where a defendant succeeds in finding a limitation could encourage
new types of copying that might hope (with less ground) to find equivalent shelter.
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unrelated to the dangers that made their behavior negligent in the first instance.
Because there is a “lack of fit” between unforeseeable harm and imposing a duty of
care, a proximate cause limitation makes sense both on juridical grounds and on
economic grounds.133
But because “proximate cause” is implemented on a fact-sensitive, case-bycase basis, which is costly, we expect to find more explanation for the doctrine, in
addition to simple “lack of fit” – and we do. Eliminating the proximate cause
doctrine, which would mean imposing liability to the extent of all unforeseeable
harms caused, could bring with it demoralizing134 and crushing burdens135 of
133

Juridically, there is no conceptual linkage between taking reasonable care and avoiding an
unforeseeable kind of harm. The proximate cause limitation makes sense economically as well,
for the law is powerless to encourage people to take precautions against invisible dangers.
A copyright analogue to ‘proximate cause’ can be found in the fair use doctrine, where courts
tend to find noninfringing a use that is quite unexpected and ‘transforms’ the purpose and
direction of the copyrighted work. See generally, Wendy J. Gordon, “Proximate Cause,
Proximate Use, and the Tort/Copyright Relation,” draft available on request, forthcoming in
HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY (2016).
134

“Demoralization cost” is a term coined by Frank Michelman to refer to disincentives (effects
that discourage productive activity) caused by the threat of large unpredictable losses. Frank
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214 (1967).
135

Having to pay an immense judgment can trigger costs much higher than the numbers in the
judgment itself. For example, tort judgments against companies can cause prices to rise and jobs
to be lost; tort judgments against individuals may mean losing a home, which in turn leaves
family members vulnerable to further losses.
The same point is true on the side of potential plaintiffs: bearing a tortious injury without
receiving compensation can result in disastrous follow-on costs for both businesses and
individuals. See Guido Calabresi Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, 27–28 (Yale
University Press, 1970) (“secondary costs”). Identifying which kinds of cost are likely to be
more serious in varying circumstances is the task of empirical research.
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liability.136 These social burdens make a difference, particularly since, given the
lack of “fit” caused by unforeseeability, the burdens would not even be partially
offset with gains in encouraging reasonable care. Taken together, these are
weighty reasons to adopt a doctrine (called 'proximate cause') to limit liability
where there is 'lack of fit' in personal injury cases.
I don't deny that lack of 'lack of fit' standing alone can and should warrant
limiting legal enforcement in some circumstances, particularly those involving free
speech and other fundamental rights. Outside the area of fundamental rights,
however, few judges demand that the legislature (in crafting rights) or a particular
plaintiff (in bringing suit) demonstrate a one-on-one correlation between a
particular exercise of right and the policies for which the right was granted. Except
perhaps for juridical purists, law must usually operate on a more wholesale level.137
Arguably copyright should be one of those rare areas where “lack of fit”
alone will suffice.138 As a matter of fundamental right, overbroad copyright
enforcement often threatens first-amendment values.139 As an economic matter,
copyright liability imposes obvious social costs. Monetary incentives for new
authorship are generated by making it more expensive to purchase copies of, or
access to, existing authorship; the increasing costs makes authorship less available
both for new authors to use140 and for consumers to purchase.

136

I am indebted to Bob Bone here.

137

I am indebted to discussions with Jane Ginsburg for her insistence on this point.

138

Fundamental liberties are usually linked to avoiding important harms; when this is true, the
lack of fit means an “extra” element of social harm is present.
139

Admittedly, we commentators perceive these threats to free speech far more easily than do the
courts.
140

A classic statement of these issues is William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 325 (1989).
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These ever-present risks counsel that copyright’s scope should generally
remain within the arena where these social costs are most likely to be outweighed
by copyright’s positive incentive effects – which is, definitionally, the arena where
the elements of the cause of action are a “good fit” with statutory purpose. Only in
the area of 'fit'-- authorial works being used for authorial purposes-- is the ability of
copyright enforcement to produce more benefits than costs likely to be more than
coincidental. And indeed, in copyright law, the fair use doctrine and a multitude of
specific exemptions provide some shelter from simple “lack of fit.” But we have
no consensus on how far the shelter should extend, and at the moment it is far from
complete.141
As an example of a "lack of fit" that might not give rise to a copyist victory,
consider a hypothetical decorator who has noticed that sheet music can make
visually pleasing patterns, and who begins manufacturing wallpaper that duplicates
the appearance of copyrighted sheet music. In papering its customers’ walls with a
particular composer’s clefs, eighth-notes, sharps and so on, the wallpaper maker is
not using the musical work as a musical work. Any connection between the notes’
visual appeal and the quality of the work’s intended aural expression is purely
coincidental. Allowing the composer to collect monies from the wallpaper maker
does nothing to reward composing skill or encourage its further development.
There is no "fit.”
It is possible such copying might be sheltered from liability. 142 Yet given
the commercial nature of the use, and the obscurity of any claim the wallpaper

141

As a matter of current doctrine, a court might impose copyright liability despite “lack of fit”
unless the defendant can demonstrate an additional public interest dimension that would be
served by giving her the contested liberty of action. Stacey Dogan makes this point about
trademark law. Stacey Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion, 37 Colum. J. L.
Arts 503, 506 (2014).
142

It might, for example, be considered “transformative” under the fair use doctrine. See, e.g.,
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (defendant
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might have to be serving the public interest, as a descriptive matter the defendant’s
likelihood of success is rather low.
By way of contrast, recall the example of copyrighted works being
reproduced for evidentiary use in court. Courts understand the importance of
providing factual evidence for litigation, and understand also how often the author
of an incriminating document might wish to assert copyright to prevent its being
copied. Establishing a rule that permits copying for evidentiary purposes serves a
public interest easily understood, and therefore such copying is routinely
accommodated by copyright’s fair use doctrine. Judges are likely to be sensitive to
the different levels of social interest at stake and, even in copyright, “lack of fit”
alone will not always generate shelter for an act of unconsented copying.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has upheld two statutory expansions of
copyright with only the roughest guess as to “fit.” Both term extension and
statutory restoration of public domain copyrights have doubtful ability to further
copyright goals, and both statutes have implications for free speech; but when
these statutes were challenged the Court declined to employ strict scrutiny.143
These developments counsel caution, even though the judiciary's role in deploying
applied miniaturized copies of copyrighted Grateful Dead concert posters to mark a timeline of
the band’s history; held not to infringe on grounds of fair use).
143

See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) upholding the revival of certain copyrights
already in the public domain; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
In Eldred the Court defined its path: declining to apply a heightened degree of scrutiny. The
opinion states that “copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations” such as
“fair use” and the idea/expression dichotomy, id. at 219, that make lesser scrutiny appropriate.
Further, to measure whether “Congress’ exercise of its Copyright Clause authority” was
“rational,” id. at 206, the Court employed an extremely broad notion of what purposes federal
copyright could legitimately serve. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, The Core of Copyright:
Authors, Not Publishers, 52 Houston L. Rev. 613 (2014) (criticizing Eldred’s analysis of
copyright’s purpose).
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doctrines like 'the explanation/use dichotomy' or 'fair use' is different from the role
the Supreme Court plays in reviewing the constitutionality of Congressional
statutes.
For such reasons, this chapter does not claim (as a descriptive matter) that a
lack of “fit” between a copyright defendant’s actions and copyright law’s overall
policy will always suffice to defeat liability. Also, given the real costs of making
fine distinctions among cases, this chapter does not claim (as a normative matter)
that all non-fitting cases of copying should escape liability. What the chapter does
claim is that line-drawing is worth the cost when copyright threatens to control the
kinds of functional uses that Baker saw as properly relegated to patent. Imposing
liability on purely functional uses not only fails to advance the goal of
incentivizing expressive activity; such liability has the potential for undermining
the patent system, with effects such as decreasing the disclosure of inventions, and
shrinking free competition among unpatented utilitarian products. The result, in
Baker’s language, could be a “fraud upon the public.”144
These are matters whose importance is difficult to understate. Therefore,
when it comes to a particular kind of disjunction – between expressive use and
functional use, or (putting it somewhat differently) between authorship and
invention – the Supreme Court in Baker held that the cost of disregarding the “lack
of fit” is too high.
That, I would argue, is the essential point of Baker v. Selden.
4.4 Should Mixed Uses Qualify for Baker’s Shelter
This chapter interprets Baker as resting not only on juridical coherence in
Drassinower’s sense, but also on consideration of social and economic cost. To
obtain Baker’s shelter, then, two elements are needed: the user's indifference to
expression (that is, “non-use” in Drassinower’s sense) and interference in patent
law’s domain.
144
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Must the use be purely functional, with no admixture of expressive value?
From an abstract juridical perspective, as long as some expressive value inheres in
the use, copyright should be able to find a mixed use (both expressive and
functional) to be an infringement. Yet concerns from outside of copyright (such as
pressure from patent’s public domain) might counsel against copyright owners
having rights over a mixed area. In terms of Baker's policies, an expressive value
should be capable of being outweighed or even trumped by a functional role.
Under Baker, must copyright remain unenforced whenever the use has a functional
aspect? These questions remain open, for in terms of our facts-- those of Oracle
and Lotus-- the nature of the use if fairly 'pure' in its functionality.
How do we know when a work of authorship is being used solely as a
functional tool?145 As suggested above, the answer must surely lie in determining
whether the defendant is indifferent to the stylistic or expressive aspect – if the
defendant would copy whatever the language or style might be, not caring in the
least for the content but only for its physical effects, then the copying is of the
“tool” variety and copyright law does not (or at least should not) reach it.146
4.5 Directness
Does the Baker rule apply only to shelter the "users" who employ the copy
functionally, or does it also shelter those from whom the "users" purchased the
copies? Lawyers usually think of “direct” versus “contributory” roles in terms of
secondary liability. (For example, we debate whether computer programs that
allow consumers to violate copyright law should be held responsible for the

145

Within “sole” or “pure” functional use, I include functional uses that are insubstantially or
trivially concerned with expression.
146

It may be that mixed uses of copyright works should sometimes be sheltered from liability. I
need not reach that question, for copying sequences of command names (Lotus) or method
headers (Oracle) for purposes of defeating switching costs is not a mixed case.
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consumers’ unlawful behavior.147) In discussing the how far the Baker doctrine
reaches, however, we address the converse: whether an actor’s contribution to
another person’s lawful act can be sheltered by the lawfulness of the assisted
behavior.
The issue has significance in many areas of copyright law, particularly fair
use, but within the confines of Baker it can be resolved straightforwardly. The
defendant in Baker v. Selden was manufacturing account books for sale to others.
Nothing in the opinion suggests it would have been necessary for the defendant to
have used the account books himself. Similarly, when a manufacturer uses a
competitor’s catalogue or drawings without permission as his source for his new
product line, the statute shelters not only those who use the product he makes, but
the manufacturers, retailers and advertisers as well.148 Therefore precedent and
statutory analogy suggest that “directness of use” is not a prerequisite to shelter
under Baker.
5 Resistance to the Use/Explanation Distinction
Some resistance to making distinctions among types of use is evident. One
hears comments such as, “If an arrangement of lines or symbols is someone’s
property, the owners should be able control any use they want. That’s what
property is for.” At one point the Nimmer copyright treatise similarly opines that
“the question of liability should turn simply on whether the defendant has copied
copyrightable elements contained in the plaintiff’s work, without regard to the
147

See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Moral Philosophy, Information Technology, and Copyright: The
Grokster Case, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 270 (Jeroen van den
Hoven & John Weckert, eds.) (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
148

17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (anyone engaged in “making, distribution, or display”); also see § 113(c)
(“In the case of a work lawfully reproduced in useful articles that have been offered for sale or
other distribution to the public, copyright does not include any right to prevent the making,
distribution, or display of pictures or photographs of such articles in connection with
advertisements or commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, or in
connection with news reports.”).
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manner in which the defendant uses or intends to use the copied material.”149 This
cannot be taken literally. An exemption for patent-type “use” is hardly the only
copyright limitation tied to “use” issues.
5.1 “Rights Over Use” as a Conceptual and Economic Fulcrum
All of copyright operates on two dimensions – to prevail in an infringement
suit, a plaintiff must prove (1) ownership of appropriate (copyrightable) subject
matter and (2) that his or her exclusive rights include control over the use that the
defendant has made of the copyrighted subject matter.
The overall structure of the Copyright Act thus ties the definition of a
copyright owner’s rights to defined uses, so that prima facie liability always varies
with the nature of the defendant’s use even in the statute’s operative core, Section
106.150 A host of additional uses are categorized as not infringing.151 So, for
149

1–2 Nimmer on Copyright at § 2.18 [D] [1]. The Treatise continues: “If … copying of
copyrightable expression occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant
employs the material for use rather than for explanation” Id.
150

See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for
Contract, 73 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1367 (1998).
It is equally hard to understand the purported irrelevance of “use” from a statutory perspective.
The Copyright Act throughout varies rights and duties according to the nature of the use, starting
with the basic section of copyright owner rights in Section 106, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). The
statute also empowers judges to make general variations by “use” in the fair use doctrine, 17
U.S.C. § 107, and variations according to use are fleshed out in the dozens of specific uselimitations embedded in the statute, id. at 108–22.
151

The shape of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights can be determined only by examining a
wide range of sections, namely 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–122, but the primary section is §106. It is
subdivided by type of use, from reproduction to performance:
§ 106. Subject to Sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1)
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example, since only “public” performances can infringe,152 an allegation of private
performance would be dismissed as not satisfying the plaintiff’s obligation to
present a prima facie case. The same should be true when a plaintiff seeks
copyright redress for rights that the Supreme Court or Congress has removed from
the copyright owner as better relegated to patent’s domain.
As already mentioned, copyright’s statutory structure places emphasis on
distinguishing among uses. Differences among uses are also central to how
copyright functions as an economic engine.
Congress provides incentives to authors largely by helping copyright owners
subject the users of their works to differential pricing (“price discrimination”)
according to intensity of use.153 Copyright law embodies a set of Congressional
decisions about which uses of a copy should be subjected to this legal power to
meter (and price) types and frequency of usage.

(2)

to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;

(3)
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4)
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5)
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6)
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.
152

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (right of public performance for literary works, musical works and
additional works other than sound recordings); § 106(6) (right of public performance for sound
recordings).
153
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See Gordon, supra note 124 at 1367.
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To illustrate, consider again the right of “public performance.”154 Because
the statute gives the copyright owner prima facie rights to control public
performance, the copyright owner can distinguish in pricing between the person
who wants to read a literary work silently to herself, and a person who wants to
read the work aloud at an auditorium or on radio. The silent reader pays whatever
price for the copy was charged by her bookstore or online supplier; her use is
contained in the base price. By contrast, the public performer has to negotiate and
pay something beyond the price of the copy in order to avoid the risk of an
infringement suit. She needs to purchase a permission or set of permissions to
cover her behavior, which usually means she has to disclose to the copyright owner
economically meaningful data about her behavior in order to obtain a meaningful
license.155
Conversely, because the statute gives the copyright owner no rights to
control private performance, the copyright owner will find it harder to distinguish
in pricing between, say, a person who wants to read to herself the published script
of a play, and an ambitious society host who wants to have his friends perform the
play during a series of dinner parties. These all are private uses under the statute,156
and do not fall within the domain of an exclusive right. The private reader, the
living-room performers, and the host may have very differing values for the text,
but each pays the same (base) price for a copy, without risk of liability arising from
how they are using it. Congress has decided not to help copyright owners
distinguish among these home uses.

154

17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (for literary works, musical works, and additional works other than
sound recordings) and § 106(6) (for sound recordings).
155

This brief discussion of permissions is not fully generalizable. A purchaser (rather than a
seeker of specific permissions) may be better able to conceal details. But even a purchaser of
copyrights needs to identify herself as such, giving the potential seller some notice of her plans.
156

Under the statute, a place is not public if it is open only to “a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances.” See 17 U.S.C. §101 (2012) (definition of “publicly”).
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Defining the types and limits of “exclusive right” is an important part of how
Congress calibrates the balance between public domain and public duty. Uses that
are within the copyright domain impose duties on the general citizenry to either
obtain permissions or refrain from use. Uses that are not within copyright owners’
control lie in copyright’s public domain.157
So “exclusive rights” over types of use are always crucial. It would be odd
indeed if one of copyright’s most important policies – to avoid interference with
patent law – found expression only in the dimension of “subject matter” and none
in the dimension of “exclusive right.”158
5.2 Further Buttressing Baker’s Use/Explanation Distinction from Attack
The Oracle court ignored Baker’s careful distinction between different kinds
of rights of control, and instead treated Baker as an on-off switch that determines
copyrightability. The fullest articulation of the reasons for such an approach
appears in the Nimmer Treatise, which argues that, “If copying of copyrightable
expression occurs, then infringement should be found, even if the defendant
employs the material for use rather than for explanation.”159 (Although David
Nimmer, the current author of the Treatise, indicates he is rethinking its position,160
157

That a behavior like “building a machine” is in copyright’s public domain, that means that the
behavior cannot be restrained or penalized by copyright. If a utility patent exists that covers the
machine, however, the behavior is not in patent’s public domain, and can be restrained by
patent law.
158

See the discussion of Hohfeld's terminology, supra note __.

In sum, a copyright owner’s claim rights over use correlate with the public’s duty to refrain from
such use.
159

The Treatise argues, Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18; also see sec. 2.18 at n 44. Nimmer’s
claim has had some influence. See, e.g., Close to My Heart, Inc. v. Enthusiast Media LLC, 508
F.Supp.2d 963 at n.3 (2007).
160

See infra note 180. At one point the Treatise follows an interpretation of Baker far more
congenial to the instant chapter’s viewpoint. See 1–2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.08[1][a] (2015).
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the Treatise’s provides a useful point of departure from which to crystallize
discussion.)
There are several reasons why it is erroneous to reject the use/explanation
distinction. Three reasons are matters of positive law. First, the Nimmer position
relies on dicta from a 1954 case whose reasoning is itself unreliable on this score.
Second, rejecting the use/explanation distinction ignores both the language of
Baker itself and post-1954 instantiations of Baker in the courts. Third, a rejection
of the use/explanation distinction is puzzling because Congress explicitly adopted
an immunity for practical “use” in the current Copyright Act.161 Finally, as a policy
matter, ignoring a defendant’s type of use would be inconsistent with both the
juridical integrity and economic logic of the copyright system.
1954 Dicta
In rejecting the use/explanation interpretation of Baker, the Nimmer Treatise
relies heavily on the 1954 Supreme Court opinion, Mazer v. Stein.162 In Mazer, a
statuette of a Balinese dancer was employed as the base for an electric lamp, and
copied for a similar use by another lamp maker.163 The 1954 Court approved
Baker, but gave Baker a reading that cautiously depended on the case’s particular
facts:
Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed;
protection is given only to the expression of the idea – not the idea itself. Thus, in
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, the Court held that a copyrighted book on a peculiar
system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a similar book using a similar plan
161

17 U.S.C. § 113(b), set forth infra at note 75. This section incorporates by reference a series
of cases that, largely relying on Baker, refuse to allow the copyright in a work that depicts a
useful article – such as the copyright in a sketch depicting an automobile or the copyright in a
blueprint depicting a motor – to be asserted against persons who actually make or build the
useful article itself.
162

See, e.g., Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18

163

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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which achieved similar results where the alleged infringer made a different
arrangement of the columns and used different headings. 164
Nimmer builds this observation from Mazer into an argument that the
Supreme Court in Mazer stripped from Baker’s heritage its concerns with
functional use.165
I think such reasoning – trying to turn Baker’s own language into a version
of the idea/expression dichotomy – misses the mark. As Professor Pamela
Samuelson has emphasized, the Court’s concern in Baker was not with the general
principle, already recognized well prior to 1880, that copyright needed to
distinguish abstract general ideas from particularized expression, but with
preventing copyright from interfering with the balance between competition and
incentive set by Congress in the law of utility patent.166
It was natural for the Court in Mazer to have treaded gingerly in discussing
Baker. In Mazer, the Supreme Court held that the copyright in the statuette gave
the plaintiff a valid copyright infringement suit against the competing lamp
maker.167 Yet lamp-making is a utilitarian kind of use, and Baker cautioned against
extending copyright over utilitarian uses.168 So perhaps it was fear of being accused
of inconsistency with Baker that led the Supreme Court in Mazer to stick to the
narrowest reading of the early case.169
164

Id. at 217.

165

Nimmer on Copyright sec. 2.18

166

See generally, Samuelson, “Systems and Processes”); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited:
The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form,
1984 Duke L. J. 663; (1984) and Samuelson, Baker v. Selden, supra note 61.
167

Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.

168

Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.

169

Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217.
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In hindsight, however, we see that the Mazer court had no reason to fear
inconsistency with Baker. The freedom to “use” that was recognized in Baker only
gave freedom to use for functional purposes, that is, freedom to copy for purposes
other than explanation and the satisfaction of aesthetic “taste.”170 By contrast with
Selden’s accounting forms, the Balinese dancer’s form served only “taste.” The
statuette’s expressive form and graceful lines had no impact on function: it did not
make the lamp’s shine any brighter or the lamp’s structure any more stable.
To further see that the statuette served no “functional” purpose, notice what
happens if the statuette’s expressive features are eliminated: Filing away the
dancer’s sculpted dress and body would leave a smooth ceramic cylinder. The
cylinder could hold up the lightbulb and shade – the lamp would function as well
as it did before.171 So enforcing copyright in the statuette posed no direct challenge
to patent law: competition based on the functions of a lamp could proceed
unimpeded whether or not the Balinese dancer shape had a copyright.172 That being

170

As mentioned above, Baker cautioned that its “observations are not intended to apply to
ornamental designs or pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste.” Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at
103–4.
171

See Samuelson, Systems and Processes at 1960 (“Because Stein’s [plaintiff’s] lamps did not
function any better or worse for having Stein’s statuette as a base instead of a block of wood, it is
consistent with Baker to hold that the statuettes were, indeed, copyrightable subject matter
because the artistic designs they embodied were physically as well as conceptually separable
from the lamps.”).
172

That is not to claim that Mazer’s impact was fully costless. The Mazer ruling did make it
more expensive for competitors to make lamps; they could not use plaintiff’s lamp base as a
form for “direct molding” and similar processes, or if they did, they would have to then strip off
the dancer’s features. However, the cost difference related only to decoration, not to function.
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the case, the defendant in Mazer was not threatened by Baker, even if the Court in
1954 was not yet in a position to articulate why.173
The results of the two opinions are sufficiently consistent with each other
that their statutory embodiments are near neighbors. Section 113(a) of the
Copyright Act embodies Mazer174 and Subsection 113(b)175 (which will be
discussed further below) embodies Baker.
Baker and its Caselaw Progeny

173

See Samuelson, Systems and Processes at 1960 (“Mazer’s observation about differences
between the Selden and Baker forms was a simple misreading of Baker, not a radical
reinterpretation of the case, its holding, and the holdings of Baker’s progeny.”).
174

Section 113(a) provides:

Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under section 106
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.
17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012). Thus, under 113(a), a statuette of a dancer did not lose copyright by
being fastened to a bulb.
175

Subsection 113(b) was a response to questions such as, “[W]ould copyright in a drawing or
model of an automobile give the artist the exclusive right to make automobiles of the same
design?” Congress essentially answered “no.” See 1976 House Report at 109. The statute
provides:
§113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
17 U.S.C. §113(b). This provision is discussed further infra at <Section D> <All internal crossreferences are tentative and will need to be checked>.
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The Nimmer treatise relied on 1954 dicta from Mazer which depicted the
defendant's victory in Baker as resting on a lack of substantial similarity between
the defendant's forms and plaintiff's form. The dicta did not accurately portray
Baker v. Selden. The Supreme Court’s 1880 opinion in Baker showed no concern
with determining how similar defendant’s forms were to those of plaintiff.
Moreover, judicial decisions since 1954 continued to posit that the
functional copying of a copyrighted design is non-infringing. As one such court
said, "It is the illustration that is protected, not the object itself.”176 The post-Mazer
precedent includes cases on which Congress relied in drafting the 1976 Copyright
Act.177
176

PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). It is not
clear that the plaintiff could have claimed originality in the design, however. A better case is
Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (which predated
Mazer). In Muller v. Triborough, the plaintiff claimed "that his copyrighted drawing [of a design
to unsnarl traffic at a bridge approach] was novel and unique and originated with him." Citing
Baker, the court characterized the design as a 'system' and ruled for the defendant despite
arguable similarities between the drawings and the actual roads the defendant had built. Note
that no challenge was made to the copyrightability of the drawing.

177

The primary legislative Report for the current Act mentioned with approval a list of twelve
cases that had appeared in the Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright (1965) at 48.
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 109 (1976)1976 House Report, at 109. Many of the cited cases
predate Mazer in 1954, but some came later. See DeSilva Construction Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F.
Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); and PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106,
110 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Thus, the DeSilva court cited the major copyright treatise of its day, Ball
on The Law of Copyright and Literary Property, which in turn explicitly relied on Baker. De
Silva, 213 F. Supp. at 195–6. (Note, however, that the Baker rationale was only one ground of
several for dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint in DeSilva.) These cases are discussed at notes
[103-106] supra.
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Congressional Implementation
An absolutist approach to “copyright as property” might suggest that an
owner’s rights will be unvarying, and that the public has no shelter for “copying
for use.” Yet not only does Baker provide such a shelter, but Congress has also
implemented Baker by explicitly enacting a statutory shelter as well. Subsection
113(b) provides that copyright in a drawing or model that “portrays a useful article
as such” (such as a copyrighted sketch of a garment, or a copyrighted blueprint for
a machine) does not grant its owner the full scope of ordinary rights to control
derivative works.178
Subsection 113(b) directs that the copyright owner has no rights over the
“making, distribution or display” of the useful article depicted.179 This is by way of
contrast to the usual rule, under which the maker of two-dimensional portrayals
(say, a drawing of a sculpture, or a sketch of a cartoon character) has derivativework rights to control the portrayal being adapted into three-dimensional form.
Thus, the owner of copyright in a drawing of a car can control the making of toys,

178

17 U.S.C. § 113 (b) provides:

This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as
such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful
article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or the
common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
Section 113(b) constitutionality is open to question on the ground of vagueness. Its vagueness
may not be fatal: at least one federal statute was held constitutional even though it incorporated
state law not yet enacted or decided. United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286 (1958). But
Section 113(b) makes reference to state and federal law in a manner so general it leaves open to
question even the sources to be incorporated by reference. See, e.g., Goldstein on Copyright §
7.4.4 (2014), especially 7:116–1120 (presenting some of the puzzles generated by the
subsection’s imprecision).
179
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murals, or movies based on the drawing, but cannot control the construction of a
working automobile based on it.
Subsection 113(b) limits the rights that attach to copyrighted portrayals of
useful articles, but does not impact the copyrightability of the portrayals
themselves. (Drawings, models, blueprints, or other portrayals of a useful article
are not themselves “useful articles” because they do no more than convey
information or portray appearance.180 Since the drawings, etc., are not useful
articles, in order to obtain copyright the portrayals need not pass the “separability
test” to which useful articles are subject.181) Rather, Subsection 113(b) leaves intact
the copyrightability of any expression that depicts a useful article, and instead
limits the rights that attach to owning the portrayal.
Patent law imposes many subtle limits on copyright, but the limit in
Subsection 113(b) is hit-over-the-head necessary: Should rights against copying
attach to an innovation merely by drawing it, describing it, or modelling it in clay,
few inventors would go through the expensive and uncertain route of trying to
persuade federal patent examiners that their mechanical invention is “novel” and
nonobvious’ – especially since the payoff from succeeding in the more difficult
and more costly route of seeking a utility patent would be to receive a right only

180

Under the statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), “A “useful article” is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information.” Therefore, a work is not “useful” (in the sense of being dangerous to patent) unless
it does something more than “convey information” or “portray appearance.” 2 Nimmer on
Copyright § 2.18 (2015). A blueprint for a mechanical device is not a “useful article,” even
though the device as built will be a “useful article.” Id.
181

The copyrightability of useful articles that are PGS works depends on whether the
“separability” test can be passed. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (definition of PGS works). Useful
articles of other kinds might need to pass different tests, such as proof that giving copyright will
not restrain competition in providing the function because, e.g., ample alternatives to the
plaintiff’s expression exist that have equal and equivalent functional advantages.
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marginally stronger than copyright’s,182 which lasts for a term of protection far
shorter than copyright provides.183 A whole area of patent law – at least, patents in
mechanical configurations, 184 and perhaps other types of inventions as well –
would cease to exist, and with it the “rights to copy and to use” that patent gives to
nonpatented inventions185 would also disappear. Subsection 113(b) prevents that
from happening.
Here is a Copyright Office Report illustrating the Subsection’s impact on
day to day objects:
[T]he copyright in a work portraying a useful article as such would
not protect against manufacture of that article…
[C]opyright protection would not extend to the following cases:
A copyrighted drawing of a chair, used to manufacture
chairs of that design;
182

As mentioned, patent plaintiffs do not have to prove copying, but with technological change
spreading works across the globe, copyright plaintiffs find it progressively easier to lead juries to
find “copying” has occurred.
183

Depending on circumstances, copyrights remain in private ownership at least for seventy
years, and often for well over a century. Utility patents expire after twenty years. See __ supra.
184

Subsection 113(b) is usually understood as addressing pictorial works or models that depict
functional three-dimensional objects. As I argue below, the subsection is not explicitly so
limited, and can also be understood as applying to non-PGS works that implicate patent issues,
such as computer programs.
185

Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989):

[T]he federal standards for patentability, at a minimum, express the congressional determination
that patent-like protection is unwarranted as to certain classes of intellectual property. … For
almost 100 years it has been well established that in the case of an expired patent, the federal
patent laws do create a federal right to “copy and to use.” Sears and Compco extended that rule
to potentially patentable ideas which are fully exposed to the public. (Emphasis in original.)
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A copyrighted scale model of an automobile, used to
manufacture automobiles of that design;
A copyrighted technical drawing showing the
construction of a machine, used to manufacture the machine;
A copyrighted picture of a dress, used to manufacture the

186

dress.

Thus, copyright can subsist in a drawing of a dress, in a blueprint of a car, or
in a scale model of a tractor or teapot. Someone who makes an unauthorized copy
of such a drawing for illustrative use in a coffee-table book would infringe the
copyright, as would someone who reproduced the scale models in a toy187 or in a
new scale model. Those are not uses of functional application that threaten patent.
By contrast, under Baker and under Subsection 113(b), the public may lawfully
employ the copyrighted drawing or model to construct working, full-size versions
of the car, dress, tractor or teapot. This is certainly a special exception pertaining to
“copying for use.”
6 Subsection 113(b) Applied Directly to Computer Programs
Subsection 113(b) does more than support the “use/explanation distinction”
in Baker. The section can be applied on its own terms to computer copyright
litigation.
Programmers write human-readable code (“source code”) that is then
“compiled” into the binary patterns that computers can understand. The resulting
186

Report of the Register of Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14,
available at http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. This 1961 Report was
approved in the 1965 Supplementary Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was
relied on in the drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976 House Report
at 109.
187

That making toys lies on the “copyright” side of the line was first determined in King
Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924). Also see Fleischer Studios, Inc. v.
Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934) (involving the Betty Boop doll).
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binary pattern, called “object code,” does more than portray information and
appearance: object code runs the machine. Object code is thus a “useful article.”188
It might be argued that human-readable source code is a “portrayal” of that useful
article. If so, Subsection 113(b) might mandate that any functional copy made from
source code is immune from charges of copyright infringement.
The following discussion addresses three issues: whether the subsection’s
language permits or requires it to be applied to computer programs; whether the
section’s origin in Baker allows the subsection to be applied to computer programs
and other “literary works”; and whether Subsection 113(b) would immunize not
only purely nonexpressive uses, but also functional uses that contain a substantial
admixture of expressive use.
6.1 Language
Subsection 113(b) appears in a section entitled, “Scope of exclusive rights
in pictorial, graphic and sculptural works” (hereinafter, “PGS” works). Computer
programs are not categorized not as PGS works but rather as “literary works.”189
The section title seems therefore to indicate that subsection (b) does not apply to
computer programs.
However, titles do not trump plain meaning. “[A] heading. … cannot limit
the plain meaning of the text.”190
The language of Subsection 113(b) itself does not mention PGS works. It
could have done so; the language of the preceding Subsection, § 113(a), quite

188

17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”)
189

See, 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a) (subject matter), 101 (definitions) (2012).

190

Yule Kim, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent Trends 31–2 CRS Report
for Congress (2008), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97–589.pdf.
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explicitly limits itself to the PGS category.191 The language of Subsection 113(b) is
by contrast not limited to any particular category of works.
The statute’s definition of “useful article,” too, is not limited to PGS works
or any other particular category of works.192 Any work that does more than
“portray” form or “convey information” (that is, any work that goes beyond
serving the expressive functions appropriate for copyright regulation) is a “useful
article”193 – which makes sense, for any such work potentially has implications for
patent.
Subsection 113(b) incorporates pre-1978 caselaw by reference, and the
legislative history mentions particular cases and gives a number of examples. On
the one hand, that the caselaw cited in the legislative history seems to involve only
PGS works194 might suggest the subsection should be confined to the PGS context
191

17 U.S.C. §§ 113(a) provides:

Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the exclusive right to
reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under Section 106
includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.
In my view, subsection (b) articulates a generally applicable rule to remind courts not to let
copyright erode patent via Section 113(a).
19217 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”)
193

I am on somewhat less secure ground here. The definition of “useful article” indicates that
proper copyright functions are to convey information or “to portray the appearance of the
article.” Id. The word “article” is quite general, which helps my interpretation, but the word also
has connotations of physicality that work against my interpretation. Similar ambiguity afflicts the
word “appearance.” The term “appearance” can mean any kind of “seeming,” thus standing in
for all types of form. This helps my interpretation. But the word “appearance” also has visual
connotations.
194

Most of the examples and cases cited by Congress or the Copyright Office addressed whether
manufacturers infringed when they based their three-dimensional functional products on two67
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and not extend to computer programs. On the other hand, none of the cited pre1978 opinions expressly limits its principles only to the PGS category.
The focus on PGS fact patterns is explicable given technological context.
The bulk of the cited examples date from a 1961 Report,195 and the list of cited
cases come from a 1965 Copyright Office Report.196 At that stage in law and
technology, copyright in product shapes posed the most obvious danger to
patent.197 The same policies that in the 1960s triggered concerns with product
shape, today also trigger concerns with computer programs.
An additional wrinkle is presented by Congress's actions in 1980. To see its
significance, consider some background:
Recall that Subsection 113(b) incorporates caselaw ending in 1977, that is,
cases decided prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act.198 In 1977,
dimensional drawings whose copyrights were owned by others. The cases are summarized in
supra notes ___[73–38]__.
195

Report of the Register of Copyrights, General Revision of the Copyright Law (1961) at 14,
available at http://copyright.gov/history/1961_registers_report.pdf/. This 1961 Report was
approved in the 1965 Supplementary Report at pages ix & 47–9, and that Report in turn was
relied on in the drafting of Subsection 113(b) in the 1976 Copyright Act. See 1976 House Report
at 109.
196

A list of twelve cases that appeared in the Supplemental Report of the Register of Copyright
(1965) at 48. The primary legislative Report for the current Act mentioned this list with
approval. See 1976 House Report at 109.
197

Ordinary literary descriptions posed little danger of giving control over systems, given
Baker’s insistence that a book copyright gave no rights over any practical sciences it might
describe.
198

Again, the statute reads as follows:

§113 (b) This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful
article as such, any greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of
the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17
68
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computer programs had uncertain copyright status; because machine-readable
copies of literary works did not count as infringing,199 little economically
meaningful protection could attach even to programs that might in the abstract be
eligible for copyright.200 That helps explain why Baker-oriented caselaw (or any
or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
199

See White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). This decision held that
copyrights could be infringed only by persons making visually perceptible copies. The decision
was overturned for most literary works by the Copyright Act of 1976, effective 1978. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “copies”) (1976); also see 1976 House Report at 52. Computer
programs, however, remained governed by 1977 law. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976); see 1976 House
Report at 116.
200

Computer source code is visually perceptible without machine aid, and in 1977 source code
probably could be federally copyrighted. But unauthorized disk copies of source code would not
infringe because the contents of a CD or other machine-readable disk are not visually perceptible
to the naked eye. Only with the new 1976 Copyright Act, effective in 1978, did the federal
copyright statute embrace all embodiments that could be perceived “with the aid of a machine or
device.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012):
“Copies” are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. … (Emphasis
added)
Therefore the federal protection available to source code would be limited (since unauthorized
object code copies would not be actionable) and object code itself would be unprotectable under
federal law.
It might be asked whether state protections for computer programs pre-1978 might be relevant.
In my view, they probably would not. Subsection 113(b) incorporates only caselaw “construed
by a court in an action brought under this title.” State copyright actions are not “brought under
this title.” They reach federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
The state rights that can appear as pendent claims in an “action brought under this title” are
claims sounding in state trademark law or other kinds of unfair competition. See 28 U.S. C.§
1338 (a):
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copyright caselaw) on computer programs would be scarce. Moreover, at the same
time that Congress adopted 113(b), it adopted a special section to govern computer
programs. That special provision, Section 117, fixed the law of computer copyright
also at the end of1977.201
Then, in 1980, Congress amended Section 117 and the copyright act’s
definitions202 to bring computer programs into modern federal copyright.203 Also,
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair
competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the [federal] copyright,
patent, plant variety protection or trademark laws. … (Emphasis added)
Nevertheless, state copyright claims have been brought under a variety of labels, including
“misappropriation” which is a type of unfair competition. So the potential relevance of pre-1978
state copyright law for Subsection 113(b) remains unresolved.
Note that in 1978, the federal copyright act abolished most state copyright law. 17 U.S.C. §301
(2012) (pre-emption).
201

17 U.S.C. §117 (1976) as originally enacted read as follows:

§117. Scope of exclusive rights: Use in conjunction with computers and similar information
systems.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 106 through 116 and 118, this title does not afford to
the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring
information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded
to works under the law, whether title 11 or the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on
December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this
title.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–553, title I, § 117, Oct. 19, 1976, available at
http://copyright.gov/history/pl94-553.pdf.
202

In 1980, Pub. L. 96–517 inserted a definition for “computer program” into the statute, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
203

70

Pub. L. 96–517.
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starting in1978, machine-readable disks counted as “copies” and, if unauthorized,
could infringe.204 However, Congress did not amend Subsection 113(b).
The upshot: Reading the 1980 amendments in conjunction with the unamended Subsection 113(b), Congress could be seen as eliminating one barrier to
enforcing copyright in computer programs but retaining another: it eliminated the
old visual-bound definition of “copy,” but retained the public’s liberty to employ
copyrighted portrayals of useful articles to make and sell functioning versions of
those articles without authorization.
6.2 Is Baker only for accounting forms and other PGS works?
Baker v. Selden205 dealt with a pictorial work. However, it was not limited
to the pictorial context. To the contrary, the Court’s analysis took as its touchstone
the public’s liberty to make machines or use systems described in books. It was
from examples involving literary works that the Court built the public’s liberty to
reproduce Selden’s pictorial accounting forms.
Thus, the Court writes:
[T]there is a clear distinction between the book as such and the art206
which it is intended to illustrate. …. A treatise on the composition and
use of medicines, be they old or new; on the construction and use of
ploughs, or watches, or churns; … would be the subject of copyright;
but no one would contend that the copyright of the treatise would give
204

The 1980 amendments eliminated the 1977 reference point that had been embedded in
Section 117, and inserted a definition of “computer program” as “literary work” into Section
101. Pub. L. 96–517 (1980). This made the general provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act – and
its definition of “copy” – applicable to programs, so that “unaided” visual perception became
irrelevant.
205

Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1800).

206

“Art” in this context refers not to aesthetics but to practical skills, as in the “arts” of
husbandry, carpentry, or medicine.
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the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described … To give to
the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially
made would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the
province of letters patent, not of copyright. …207
The Court repeats and elaborates the point,208 and returns to new literarywork examples, such as books about the art of perspective.209
When the Court finally turns to graphic and pictorial works (such as the
accounting forms at issue in Baker), the opinion returns to literary works as its first
and primary point of reference:
Had he used words of description instead of diagrams (which merely stand
in the place of words), there could not be the slightest doubt that others, applying
the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the lines and diagrams which were in
the author’s mind, and which he thus described by words in his book.210

207

Id. at 102 (emphasis added).

208

The Court writes:
…Take the case of medicines. Certain mixtures are found to be of great value in the
healing art. If the discoverer writes and publishes a book on the subject (as regular
physicians generally do), he gains no exclusive right to he gains no exclusive right to the
manufacture and sale of the medicine; he gives that to the public. If he desires to acquire
such exclusive right, he must obtain a patent for the mixture as a new art, manufacture, or
composition of matter.

Baker v Selden, 101 U.S. 102–3 (emphasis added)
209

Id. at 103.

210

Id. at 103 (emphasis added). The Court wrote these works in regard to one of its many
examples, namely, a “book on perspective.” The opinion quickly made clear, id. at 104, that
these observations were directed to Selden’s accounting forms as well.
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Just as a graphic design or a set of diagrams “merely stand in the place of
words”211 for the Court in Baker, so can words stand in the place of graphic
designs and diagrams for Subsection 113(b).
To see how closely Subsection 113(b) fits Baker’s treatment of literary
works, note that Baker ‘s examples could be restated using the words of the
subsection: The subsection tells us that an “owner of copyright in a work that
portrays a useful article as such” has no rights to control the manufacture of the
useful article itself. Therefore (turning to Baker’s examples), the “owner of
copyright in a [literary] work that portrays” a medicine, system or device, gives no
rights to control those who use the book to make the medicine, employ the system
or build the device.212
6.3 Mixed Uses
Baker’s facts seem to describe a purely functional use of the accounting
forms. If Subsection 113(b) goes further, and applies even to uses that mix
functional and expressive uses, the subsection’s sweep against the enforceability of
programs will be broad indeed, because most copies of computer programs will be
used functionally at least in part.213 Does Subsection 113(b) extend to mixed uses?
211

Baker at 103. The paragraph from which the quoted words are drawn is quoted in full just
above, in text at note 117.
212

In the Court’s words, “The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.”
Id. at 103
213

Source code can be copied for explanatory purposes. For example, open-source licenses
typically require the sharing of source code in part to explain what a program does and how it
does it. See www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.en.html.
Copying source code for explanatory purposes without license can infringe. Section 113(b) by its
own terms has no relevance to copying done to serve proper copyright purposes such as
explanation and amusement. See __ supra.

73

WJ GORDON April 7, 2016 DRAFT HOW ORACLE ERRED (LONG VERSION)

The post-Baker cases that give meaning to Subsection 113(b)214 suggest it
might extend so far. The cases involved inter alia chairs, lighting fixtures, and
other furnishings that various defendants had “built” without permission by
copying their competitors’ copyrighted drawings and photos. It is highly likely that
some of these copyrighted pictorial works showed furnishings that contained
separable ornamental features, such as statuettes on lamp bases or flower designs
on upholstery. It is even likely that some of the copying was motivated by a desire
to capitalize on the market appeal of such ornamental elements.
Yet the courts gave the defendants in these cases the liberty to build and sell
working duplicates of what appeared in the pictures, without regard to whether or
not the portrayed objects might have contained separable ornamental features. 215
Consider a drawing of a chair that contained a separable work of authorship (such
as an original design of colors or flowers applied to the chair seat). These cases
seem to suggest that the act of constructing the article depicted cannot result in
infringement even if the defendant’s chair seat bore a duplicate of the separable
flower design.216 If so, the limits that Subsection 113(b) puts on a copyright
214

The cases are summarized at notes _ [103-107]_ supra.

215

“An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a useful article.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (“definition of useful article”). Subsection 113(b) gives rights to build whatever is depicted
in the drawing of the useful article, which according to this definition would include all parts,
including separable artistic works.
Thus, there is no infringement when a stranger without authorization builds a chair that
purposely duplicates a copyrighted portrayal – even a portrayal that shows a chair designed with
a separable ornament. The rule is different if a designer does more than portray her design in a
drawing or sketch, but actually builds it. A stranger who builds a chair that purposely duplicates
a designer’s as-built chair might infringe if the chair has an ornament that is arguably separable.
216

Under this provision’s wording, a designer who sketched a chair (for example) could not use
her copyright in the two-dimensional sketch to restrain a competitor from building the chair,
even if the designer had included in her sketch elements of the chair which would be “separable”
(and copyrightable) if she built the chair. Paul Goldstein criticizes the subsection for exempting
the copying of “separable” features from a copyrighted portrayal of a useful object, but does not
74

WJ GORDON April 7, 2016 DRAFT HOW ORACLE ERRED (LONG VERSION)

owner’s rights apply to shelter copying that is partly motivated by expressive
concerns. Giving Subsection 113(b) such breadth for PGS works makes some
sense: no one wants the utilitarian product markets to be subject to strike suits by
doodlers who see some resemblance between a manufactured product and some
fantasy sketches they have posted on social media.217 If the doodlers cannot argue
“separability” as a way to withstand motions to dismiss – if Section 113(b) can be
seem to challenge that the subsection has that effect. 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.4.4.1, 118
(2014). He suggests that a court should first assess the copyrightable elements if any in the
design being depicted, and then compare that element of copyrightable (separable) expression to
the appearance of the defendant’s functioning object.
Instead, the subsection seems to provide that the designer would have to authorize the
construction of an actual chair in order to have copyright in the separable components.
There are some good reasons for requiring the designer to engage in such a two-step dance.
Images of useful and potentially useful articles abound, from Dufy’s sailboats to Dali’s melting
watches. Should a designer of actual objects be afraid to take inspiration from the painters and
visual fantasists who might never make the three-dimensional objects they have dreamed up and
depicted on canvas or in print? The Section 113(b) rule means that only copying from an actual
useful article will make someone liable for reproducing the separable (copyrightable) parts.
Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly cumbersome to withhold copyright in “separable” parts until the
designer brings the useful article to life. Paul Goldstein argues as a policy matter that this aspect
of Subsection 113(b) should be altered.
217

Note that my example here focuses on a plaintiff's sketches rather than on a plaintiff's
constructed design. The law may differ for each context.
Subsection 113(b) appears to allow members of the public to build any and all aspects of a useful
article that they copy from a copyrighted drawing, whether or not any aesthetic element is
'separable' from the useful components. By contrast, if the designer actually constructed the
article in question, she could have a copyright in its 'separable' elements.
The difference in legal result may be attributable to the minor investment required to merely
sketch a useful article (and thus the greater threat that, in the absence of Subsection 113(b),
sketches would pose to patent) as compared with the effort required to construct a threedimensional article.
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used even by defendants who “build” and use a portrayal’s expressive content –
patent law may be safer.
But for computer programs, it is dangerous to extend Subsection 113(b) to
shelter functional uses with substantial expressive content. It’s hard to imagine any
functional copying of source code that could survive a statute so interpreted. Also,
if Subsection 113(b) extended that far, it would make other computer-related
provisions of the Copyright Act surplusage.218

218

In the 1980 amendments to Section 117, Congress gave the public some liberties to use
computer programs functionally. For the public to need such a specific set of liberties, Congress
would seem to have been assuming that (without the specified new liberties) some functional
uses of programs could be infringing. If Subsection 113(b) reached mixed uses, then all but the
archival portion of Section 117 would be surplusage. (The liberty to make and keep an archival
copy, 17 U.S.C. 117(a) (2) (2012), does not involve a functional use, and thus does not invoke
either Baker or Subsection 113(b).)
By contrast, if Subsection 113(b) reaches only uses that are very substantially or purely
functional, then computer copyrights would remain enforceable against defendants whose
purposes are substantially related to “style and expression.” (Were copying of programs never
done for purposes related to “style and expression,” CONTU at 22, then Congress certainly did
err – perhaps on a Constitutional level – in accepting computer programs into the list of
copyrightable works!)
In short, a narrow reading Section 113(b) leaves untouched all copying that is done for mixed
purposes of function and expressiveness. If so, Section 117 provides liberties that go beyond
Section 113(b), and applying 113(b) to computer programs does not make Section 117
surplusage.
If copying for mixed purposes of function and expressiveness is not embraced by Baker or by
Subsection 113(b), a wide range of copying remains potentially open to copyright’s control –
that is, Baker leaves untouched all copying that is done for mixed purposes of function and
expressiveness. If so, Section 117 provides needed liberties that go beyond Section 113(b), and is
not surplusage.
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As a policy matter, this chapter argues, Subsection 113(b) should either be
limited to purely functional and nonexpressive uses, or should be limited to PGS
works.
Limiting the subsection to functional uses that are fully non-expressive is
admittedly in some tension with the language of the subsection, for that language
seems to treat all “portrayals of useful articles” the same. But it must be
remembered that Subsection 113(b) merely incorporates caselaw, including
distinctions that the caselaw might embody. Refusing to apply Subsection 113(b)
to “mixed” uses is not inconsistent with the relevant caselaw. None of the cases I
have found explicitly say that deference to patent requires giving the public a
liberty to construct useful articles that have separable and copyrightable parts.
Under my more narrow reading, then, the subsection would only shelter use that is
both functional and fully nonexpressive.
One final note is needed, regarding the copying of “object code,” that is,
copying directly from the machine-readable disk to make another disk.
6.4 Copying Computer Object Code
Subsection 113(b) limits the rights of those who own copyrights in drawings
and other portrays of useful articles, and does not limit the rights of those who own
copyrights in useful articles themselves.219 And useful articles can indeed have
copyrights.220 A computer programmer typically does more than “portray” a useful

219

Note that Subsection 113(b) is also inapplicable to cases where the defendant has copied a
work that portrays an article that is not useful. This rule does not change even if the copy is then
applied to a useful object. See Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., 7 F. 202 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1888)
(infringement results from copying an artistic work even though the defendant used it to decorate
a chair back); 17 U.S.C. 113(a) (2012),
220

Useful articles can have copyright. As mentioned, “PGS works” that are useful articles can be
copyrighted as to those aspects that pass a “separability” test. 17 U.S.C. 101 (2012) (defining
PGS works). “Architectural works” that are useful articles are copyrightable to the extent their
features are not “functionally required.” See H.R. Rep. No. 101–735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 20–
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article. Consider Sun Microsystems, Oracle’s predecessor in interest which was
largely responsible for Java. Sun not only created Java source code (a “portrayal”
of a useful article); it actually created indisputably “useful article” namely, Java
object code.
Even if making a functional copy of a source code (a “portrayal”) is noninfringing because of Subsection 113(b), that section is simply inapplicable to acts
that copy useful articles themselves. Infringement can result from making a
functional copy of object code.
As a factual matter, it seems unlikely that Google copied Java object code.221
But what if a defendant also copied from object code? If so, Subsection 113(b)
drops out as a potential shelter for that aspect of the defendant’s behavior.
21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951–2. Different kinds of useful articles can
thus be governed by different tests.
What tests should govern the copyrightability of computer code is of course much debated in the
context of Oracle v. Google. This chapter does not reach that issue, but rather addresses the
question of what rights should attach to code even if copyrightable.
221

Source-code versions of Java commands and input specs were widely available, and evidence
in the case shows that Google did indeed use the source code. For example, a “slide show” that
Java prepared for litigation highlighted this colloquy (from a deposition):
Q.
Did you consult the Java docs when doing your work on the API implementations for
Android?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. And where did you obtain those Java docs?

A.

They’re posted for free on Sun’s website.

Deposition of Bob Lee, August 3, 2011, quoted in Google Employees Consulted Sun’s
Copyrighted Java Materials When Implementing Android, from Oracle Slideshow, available at
www.cnet.com/pictures/oracles-slideshow-alleging-how-google-copied-java-images/2/ (last
visited June 29, 2015)
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Nevertheless, as for all copying, a copyright owner’s rights over the copying
of object code are governed by Supreme Court precedent, including Baker. If the
copying was fully nonexpressive in nature, then under Baker no infringement of
copyright would result.
6.5 Does the breadth of Subsection 113(b) govern?
Baker mandates freedom to copy non-expressively; its mandate is less clear
in cases where copying is a mixed case of expressive and nonexpressive use. By
contrast, Subsection 113(b) is not limited by inquiry into the defendant's pure
concern with function. It is likely that attractive features triggered some of the
copying of furniture and lamps in the old cases; Subsection 113(b) seems to
mandate that the public has freedom to copy portrayals of useful articles by
building the articles even if the copying was partly motivated by a desire to capture
expressive elements.
Subsection 113(b) thus might sweep more broadly than Baker itself.
Fortunately, in cases of fully nonexpressive copying like Oracle, the courts
need not reach the scope of Subsection 113(b). Baker itself suffices. In fact, in the
computer context, I think that Subsection 113(b) functions best as an echo and
reinforcement for Baker rather than an independent source of command. It is
nevertheless time for the legal community to see that the subsection potentially has
significant impact.
7 Conclusion
Copyright has no inherent interest in governing copying that is indifferent to
expression, such as copying a letter to present evidence in a lawsuit, or copying a
sculptural key shape to unlock a door. To regulate such copying would be foreign
to copyright’s interior logic.222 From an economic perspective, also, incentives to
create more or better expression can have only random correlation with copying
that is motivated by expressive-indifferent concerns.
222
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For one eloquent view of this interior logic, see Drassinower, discussed supra at __.
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Because line-drawing among types of copying can be costly, infringement
claims need not be struck down every time an act of copying does not “fit”
copyright’s expressive paradigm. But often a lack of “fit” is linked to significant
policy concerns. In Baker v. Selden the Supreme Court made clear that linedrawing among forms of copying is worth the attendant costs, and must be done,
when broad enforcement would give copyright law the power to redraw boundaries
that Congress has entrusted to patent.
It is not just caselaw that demonstrates this sensitivity. The Copyright Act
also includes provisions that limit copyright owners’ rights out of deference to
patent law.
One such Copyright Act provision, Subsection 113(b), provides that the
rights that attach to owning copyright in the portrayal of a useful article do not
cover the functional use – the making or sale – of the useful article itself. Taking
the section literally, it could immunize defendants who made functional copies of
source code because source code is a “portrayal” of the useful article known as
object code. In the recent case of Oracle v. Google, it appears that Google copied
from source code rather than from object code; if so, Google’s copying could be
sheltered by Subsection 113(b).
However, Subsection 113(b) may sweep very broadly, and it is not certain
how Congress meant its language to be interpreted. Baker itself can suffice to
resolve Oracle v. Google and similar disputes. Baker indicates that where copying
is done with indifference to expressive values, and to serve utilitarian goals of the
kind that governed by the law of utility patent, copyright infringement should not
result.
Oracle v. Google, like Lotus v. Borland before it, involves a kind of
interoperability that is needed to fight lock-in: interoperability between a
newcomer program and the relevant public’s habituated skills and its existing
macros or other programs. In the Oracle case, the goal of the copying was to help
third-party programmers, who were habituated to Java, more easily interoperate
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with Google’s Android platform. Google’s copying the familiar method headers
from Java into Android enabled the programmers choose whether or not to work
with the Android platform on its merits, rather than being discouraged by the
switching costs involved in recrafting their programming habits. In Lotus, the goal
of the copying was to help customers of an established spreadsheet program decide
whether or not to choose a new spreadsheet program on its merits, rather than
being held to the old program by the switching costs involved in learning new
meanings for keys and recreating macros.
In both these cases, the plaintiff’s programs were not copied because they
embodied skilled expression; in both cases the defendants carried the “heavy
lifting” of creating new implementation code independently. What copying
occurred was not done to spare the defendants the effort, money, or other resources
that would be involved in creating high-quality expression. Instead, the copying
was done for the purpose of conforming with exactness to whatever the dominant
program specified; the copying was done without regard to the quality, vel non, of
what was copied.
Under the canonical case of Baker v. Selden, as reinforced by Baker’s
progeny in both caselaw and the copyright statute, the copying in Lotus and Oracle
did not infringe. And this conclusion need not follow from copyrightability, or
from “fair use,” but from the plaintiff’s lack of prima facie right to control
functional use. Going forward in Oracle and other cases that charge infringement
of computer copyrights, Baker’s use/explanation distinction can play a clarifying
role. Patent law gives the public rights to copy and to use223 that Baker, its
progeny, and the pattern of the copyright statute all tell us copyright should not
undo.

223
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Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–5 (1989).
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